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marine t errninal will 
years. described the levels spills are 
response to oil 
spilled only 
Exxon has over of oil and 
to 
spills caused by tanker transportation is rare or unlikely according to 
showed that after the passage of the Port and Tanker Safety Act in 1978, 
and pipelines have decreased. 
Anderson, president of Get Oil Out, testified that GOO has now the safe development 
major concern. Spills continue to happen in spite of improved safety 
and improved training. There wiU always be spills as long as the 
described the effects and costs of a tanker platform collison, similar to those 
in the Gulf of tv1exico. 
more stringent liability laws and more effective equipment 
the Channel should be regulated and limitations should be placed on the 
the Channel. 
coordinator of Santa Barbara County Emergency Services, described 
to identify the plan for the risks of offshore oil operations. Jurisdiction 
are the major problems in such planning. 
Edward Grace, chief of Marine Safety for the 11th Coast Guard District, discussed 
response in all waters off Southern California. Overall contingency plans have been set 
plans for every pollution incident. Each incident may have unpredictable events 
flexible. 
Coast Guard is the Federal on-scene coordinator in charge at all oil spills. The if 
respond first and bear the costs. 
was asked if the vessel traffic lanes should be extended to the West around 
can effectiveLy contain oil spills in open water. He replied that 
extended completely because of the lack of visual aids, and that weather and sea 
make oil containment equipment ineffective. 
Cudd, of Vandenberg Air Force Base, pointed out that the Air Force no 
and no capability to respond to an offshore accident. It can provide 
and its hospital facitities could help. 
concerns are 
Peterson, of the Santa Barbara County Fire Department, said the County's strong 
low frequency, high magnitude events. Fire response plans call for an oil industry-
are not 
at Gaviota and a fireboat. 
for dealing with a large oil fire is in San Francisco and Los Angeles. 
may not respond to local concerns. Santa Barbara County does not have 
or capability to deal with the problems. 
Oil Spill Response plan gives the California Department of Fish and 
agency in oil spills. Captain Edward Simons of Fish 
Department uses that authority and the decisions it must make. The Director of Fish and 
chairman of the Interagency Oil Spill Committee. 
rehabilitates organisms damaged in oil spills. There are three sites on the coast 
b and otters. Money is needed to equip these facilities. SB 686 and SB 959 could 
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provide funds to study the effects of dispersants and oil on marine 
When the that mergency 
and soon a dozen 
limited coast currents waters and 
to rio Birds to be oil up. 
the work. Jurisdictional roles were well-coordinated. 
Vince Agapedo, of the Santa Barbara said that governmental 
do not have the capability to deal with large oil fires. as Hell 
must be called in. They are specialists in fighting fires. 
Soots and Coots is such a group. In the event of a severe oil on or offshore~ they could be 
on-scene with men and equipment to 24 Hell Fighters are some of the 
best in the world. the County not depend on such 
because they may not be available when needed. 
decisions on how much risk they can accept and how 
those risks. 
and local must make some hard 
they will spend to prevent and mitigate 
Marie DeSantis, formerly in the fishing industry and presently an author and writer for The 
National Fisherman, expressed the view the does not exist to pick up spilled oil in 
conditions often found in the open seas. She that a state-of-the-art cleanup 
vessel by the oil companies, recovered only one percent of the oil spilled in the ......;;;...;;..:...;~ 
Rican and could not work on the open seas in the conditions 
Dr. Michael of the Tiburon Institute of mental Studies, spent a year studying 
"E" for an executive summary of that stud The :......:o:.;::..;;:,..:;.;;;..~:.;::.;:= 
outside the Golden Gate. Towed out to sea, the vessel broke in half 
near the Pt. Reyes Marine Sanctuary. The stern sank and is still oil; the bow was safely 
b into Francisco. thousand barrels of oil were spilled. 
a his y, he recommended increased more 
better understanding of coastal current regimes and designated areas in which 
to tow boats. should pay for and needed to realize 
recommendation. 
region, was so 
California 
Councilman 
that the 
risks of fires and 
on the pipeline 
Dr. that the Santa 
accidents. of 
regions also. 
representing the 
is the 
It is difficult to read and evaluate 
Channel, long an oil-producing 
recommendations made for Northern 
California Association of Governments, 
of oil Pipelines 
jargon used in the EIS/EIRs 
Mr. Burl Waage gave the history of Clean Seas, a consorlium founded in 1970 and supported by 
16 oil companies. Although likelihood of a significant spill today extremely remote, every 
effort must be made, the best available to deal with such an eventuali Clean 
Seas was to do this. 
-4-
Clean Mr. Clean I, and Mr. Clean II must be capable of recovering oil 8-
20-knot winds. They are also rapid response craft which can deliver 
a very short time. 
are held at least twice monthly and are monitored by government agencies. The 
inerals Management Service evaluate the industry's ability to contain and clean 
has evaluated the ability of Clean Seas to deal with offshore oil spills. 
has reached the upper ability to mechanically contain spilts. Research is now 
on methods of chemically and biologically dealing with spilled oil. 
Rochte, of the California Conservation Corps, described the resources the Corps can 
in case of emergencies. In one to four hours, the Corps can provide personnel and to 
spills. They have responded to three large oil cleanup operations in the last 
Hansch, of the California Coastal Commission, was concerned about the risks of 
and gas operations. The Commission requires that offshore oil facilities mitigate all risks, it 
ment and training to do this. 
must be upgraded. Oit spilt containment and cleanup equipment is effective only in 
seas. The accumulated risks of offshore drilling and tankering must be evaluated 
thresholds and risks established. 
Rogalin, also of the California Coastal Commission, gave the statistics of 38 
from 1969 to 1979. Statistics can be interpreted in different ways. For 
a vessel explosion in port are given as once in 80 years. However, there were 
ports in the last few years. 
measures to prevent oil accidents involve training, inspection and equipment. Local 
facilities and acquire equipment such as fireboats. Legislative 
and enforce safety standards. 
Scherb, a consultant on marine safety, stated that management must be made 
for safety. Modern technology can provide data banks and black box recorders to monitor 
and catch problems on ships and platforms before a disaster happens. Rather than 
completed projects, the philosophy should be to improve initial design. 
testified regarding CAORF (Computer Aided Operations Research Facility) 
since 1976. Its equipment can simulate any vessel in any location. By modeling 
movements of ships and simulating the perspective of the vessel captain, data can be obtained 
that can determine the levels of risk involved. Safer procedures for vessel handling and vessel traffic 
can then be designed. 
Gordon Cota, a Santa Barbara fisherman, reported that the American Flag vessels 
encountered in the Channel have well-trained professional crews. The big problem is that of foreign 
vessels 
if 
no English-speaking crew members. He pointed out. that the best technology does no 
mistakes are made. 
Aspland, of Area Marine, recommended a strong organization of terminal operators, 
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merchant marine, and local government to set up operating procedures and environmental protection. 
Existing legislation and regulations are sufficient. The key is enforcement 
Technology exists to meet the requirements of safe marine transportation. The human 
is the unpredictable part of the system. Good people must be continuously 
Dr. Jean-Louis Armand, chairman of the Department of Mechanical and Environmental 
Engineering at UCSB, told how Norway, in the last decade, has become the leader in the of 
advanced offshore technology. A levy on offshore oil produced supports the work of groups such as 
Det Norske Veritas. They establish standards for the construction, operation, and inspection of 
offshore oil structures. He suggested that a similar group, drawing on the expertise of the University 
of California, be supported in this region by government and industry. 
Senator Hart, Senator Marks, and Professor Armand discussed the taxing mechanism used in 
Norway to support their research. There is some timid support for such work this country, but 
more should be done. 
A statement by Professor Marshall Tulin, of the Ocean Engineering group at UCS8, was then 
read. He recommends that a Center of Expertise be established in the State of California to study 
the risks of offshore oil operations. He believes it is important to conduct such studies before 
accidents happen. 
Dr. Floyd Tuler, of the \llechanica! Engineering Department at Worcester Polytechnic Institute 
in Massachusetts, discussed the use of risk analysis in the management of offshore oil operations. It 
can help set policy and establish priorities. Conflicts can be resolved. 
Risk analysis is not a panacea for management of oil operations. It has limitations and, being 
based on probability, it is different from most conventional engineering analysis. It is a useful tool 
for identifying and mitigating hazards. 
Mr. Clair Ghylin, of Chevron Oil Company, took the position that we have enough laws and 
regulations governing exploration and production in the OCS. He recommends more coordination and 
cooperation between industry and all levels of government to insure that those regulations work 
effectively. 
He described the large number of permits that must be obtained before starting offshore oil 
operations and the time and money involved. The situation is ongoing and volatile and much analysis 
is necessary. Voluntary cooperation using existing methods is to be preferred to new legislation. 
Senator Hart, Mr. Ghylin, Mr. Trout, and Mr. Dunaway discussed training and certification for 
offshore oil workers. 
Mr. Robert Salient of the Sierra Club, called for the streamlining of existing procedures, not the 
creation of additional requirements. Putting many conditions and regulations on paper does not 
guarantee their effectiveness. What is needed is a joint powers agreement among existing agencies 
that could cross jurisdictional lines. There are now three sets of authorities dealing with the region 
from coast to open seas. 
Ms. Marty Blum, of the Santa Barbara League of Women Voters, pointed out that the present 
case-by-case planning process is part of the problem. It does not allow for long-range consideration 
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impact of offshore oil operations. 
League recommends that planning for accidents be thoroughly coordinated by 
involved. The Coastal Commission should be funded and local air quality must 
of general public addressed the Subcommittee. 
Pennington, of World Oil Products, described a hydraulicatly operated valve to 
stem. Present valves operate manually and might not close in time to prevent an accident. 
George Silva, a consultant in emergency planning, discussed the nature of risks and the 
all-encompassing risk analysis of offshore oil operations. He recommended that 
some oil-generated revenues be committed to such a comprehensive analysis that would 
the entire State, and the oil industry. 
Michael McDermott, who holds a 2nd mates license in the U.S. Merchant Marine, gave some 
standpoint of a professional mariner who has sailed on West Coast tankers. 
human element is still the key factor. If men are tired and stand watch too often too 
they are more prone to make mistakes in judgment.. The human element enters 
in accidents. A mariner is not going to incur salvage and tow expenses that may cost 
if any alternative seems possible. Expensive safety procedures are frowned on by coast 
management. 
It is often difficult to use ship-to-ship radio effectively to prevent possible collisions. 
extended past Pt. Conception and safety zones must take into account the maneuvering 
oceangoing vessels. 
are often not reported and dishwashing soap is used to disperse them. Bilges and 
are out at sea. 
recommended a Santa Barbara port authority that would deal with the problems of the Santa 
roadstead. It would give better regulatory control and permit effective inspection. 
Geoffrey Chung, of the UCSB Environmental Health and Safety Office, commented on 
The campus, because of its unique proximity to oil operations, is exposed to 
severe accidents such as fires, air pollution at toxic levels, and oil on its beaches. There 
coordinated contingency plans to deal with such accidents. 
Hart thanked his colleagues on the Committee and the hearing participants. 
major issues that emerged during the hearing: Jurisdiction is a problem. Who is 
at an accident and who makes the decisions? National and international bodies are involved 
communication and coordination with them must be established. 
are existing regulations to be enforced? There must be better understanding of what is 
and what conditions are being imposed. 
nmittee is concerned with funding of the Coast Guard and with research on the risks 
oil operations. 
sea lanes around Pt. Conception should be extended and fire prevention and firefighting 
must improved. 
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The Puerto Rican incident must be carefully studied for insights as to what happened and what 
steps should be taken in this region to prevent such disasters. 
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9:15 a.m. Senator Gary Hart called the hearing to order. He welcomed members of the L 
and thanked the hearing organizers. 
Present at the hearing table 
Senator Milton Marks, 
Senator Hart: 
Francisco 
Assemblyman Jack O'Connell, Santa Barbara 
Senator Dan McCorquodale, San Jose 
Mr. Barry Schuyler, Lecturer, Environmental Studies Program, University of California at 
Santa Barbara 
Mr. Jerry Seedborg, Consultant to Subcommittee 
CHAIRMAN GARY HART: Oil and gas development by its very nature is a hazardous activity 
with inherent risks such as spills, fires, and escaping gases; and too oflen, legislative bodies only get 
involved with such issues after there is an accident or problem. Today we will try to gather 
information from a broad group of participants and experts as to how we can best prevent such 
accidents from occurring and how to deal with them should they ever occur. We're looking for 
recommendations for the State of California to help insure the safest possible environment in which 
oil and gas development can occur. Certainly here in this area we have seen a dramatic expansion in 
activity in the Santa Barbara Channel by both the Federal Government and new lease sales proposed 
by the State Lands Commission. We're hoping today to utilize the Santa Barbara Channel and Santa 
Maria Basin as a case study as to how these problems can and should be addressed. 
Session I 
An overview of oil operations in the region for the next 25 yenrs: Risks and consequences of 
accidents. 
Panelists: Diane Guzman -Santa Barbara County Department of Resource Management 
James Trout - State Lands Commission 
Tom Dunaway- Mineral Management Service (MMS) 
Don Cornett - Exxon, USA 
David Anderson - Get Oil Out, Inc. 
MS. DIANE GUZMAN: This is a summary of offshore activity in Santa Barbara County and a 
review of existing development, proposed development, local review process and the manner in which 
risks are assessed. Santa Barbara has had offshore oil development since the 1880s with wooden 
platforms offshore Summerland. In 1929, we had the first leases in State waters; in 1958, ! he first 
offshore platform, Hazel; in 1969, the now famous oil spill; and since 1982, an unprecedented amount 
of offshore oil projects. Existing facilities are show on the overhead. We currently have 19 
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in State 3 marine terminals, 5 
about eo million cubic feet of gas and 80,000 barrels of oil per 
facilities. 
in Federal waters with another 15 theoretical, 
proposed in State waters; plus additional ones if 
approved 1 consolidated marine terminal, 2 
coast. We are planning for 2 consolidated sites in the 
gas and 500,000 barrels of oil per day at the peak. So you can see 
proposed activity. 
We have been in the permitting phase, and still are in the permitting 
1982. These are only the major projects. Actual construction won't start 
for any production to come on-line in 1988 and 1989. We have 
but there is still time for additional factors to be built into these 
County review process can be summarized with a couple of statements. 
aggressive local participation, and we have spent over $12 million in 
doing major studies. We will have had 20 major projects to we 
Federal Government and State Government in joint review 
both Federal and State participation. In each of 
there have been extensive conditions; in many cases, over 
project. Many of these address the risk situation. 
y we have addressed are pipeline transportation, 
Among the risks that we have studied are geology, 
biology, fishing and offshore uses, system safety and reliab 
Federal and State studies has been from the government, 
oil companies. 
geology, we have looked at site selection, consolidation 
platforms, pipelines, on and offshore facilities, pier and loading areas, 
restructuring. 
we have studied the issue of pipeline transportation and found it to 
v asked for the best available 
and asked for the minimization of onsite 
to those essential for production. 
we 
vessel traffic corridors, limited the use of chemical 
moorings, no construction during whale migration and efforts to 
freshwater biology: pipeline inspections, spill contingency plans, avoidance of 
air monitoring, slope stabilization, replanting, and erosion control. 
usage: minimize offshore production, response time and re-estab kelp 
lanes and the need lo remove construction scars. 
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System safety and reliability: We studied fire stations 
by-products, and 
Del Mar School). 
weather surveillance and 
human exposure to areas 
has 
waste 
risks (e.g., 
We need Conclusion: 
aggressive local role review of large local our role is to review 
facilities and the permits associated with those, we have expanded substantially. Joint 
panel is a substantial improvement and brings the of 
together. Extensive studies have required comprehensive conditions, enforcement, 
programs, and periodic updates as we learn more about situations and 
CHAIRMAN HART: What is time frame for 
barrels per day by 1992 or 1993. 
MR. JAMES TROUT: The State Lands Commission on the 
oil-related accident can occur; and its inception the Commission has 
preventing accidents and developing rules and regulations coupled with onsite 
monitoring 
an 
active in 
In the Santa area, production is 10 percent per year; from 40 
existing 25 are currently produc We have 19 leases. In the 
next 25 years, we will see the resumpti'ln some of the leases that are not now producing, 
the from 5 that were formally leased and quitclaimed to the State. the 
next 20 years we of the Pt. to Arguello eight tracts 
were in and were since We need to 
This the from drlll ships, seaport 
facilities, marine tanker terminals and pipeline. 
In the Commission the that the best way to a 
has been done 
critical are shut down such as when weather and sea 
containment and recovery ineffective~ or 
was to it 
and enforcement. 
make oil 
there is no 
oil containment or cleanup vessel available. are times when critical are not 
at times when weather is not 
The we've contain information on 
of 
cleanup equipment, and onsite containment 
blow-out prevention equipment and safety 
H2S environment and daily monitoring of drilling and 
We have been on adopting one set of 
one set of regulations rather than two. 
Safety 
well work. 
so we 
oil 
of 
in an 
in 
The Commission has been on the and control for over years 
with onsite inspection and with full and 
proposed marine terminal safety program and it for three years, manual written and 
for all State-leased We've had a 
was not authorized by the Legislature after the Federal funding 
and is not in effect at this time. No one is now inspecting 
to inspect them. This is one area that the 
safety and analysis for which the 
step in production safety. We are now working on 
in 1983 that includes cleanup and containment 
for the State and Federal agencies involved in these drills; a full-time 
sea state and temperature data collection, such as Diane mentioned, and 
on whales and sea otters and fish eggs and larvae. 
we see at this point, and the role that the State has taken in preventing the 
accident. 
How often do platforms close down in the event of bad 
area, and how often does it occur? 
answer that, but maybe Mr. Don Everitts, who is in our 
can answer that. 
: We have not done it yet, but the regulations are posted on the 
HART: What is the criteria for a platform to shut down? 
If seas are too high, or we can't test or bring materials out. No 
are satisfactory. 
operations are not done, such as removing drilling bits 
holes, or after holes. 
Are you familiar with Section 8574 dealing 
to followed by anyone who owns or operates a 
products in the territorial waters of this State. Procedures must 
plan written that will reasonably prevent an oil 
we 
operations in the territorial waters of the State. If a spill does take place, 
must deal with mitigating measures. This oil spill contingency plan must be 
of Resources Agency and any such vessel operation who to f an 
is guilty of a misdemeanor. Now how do you comply 
This act applies to the Department of Emergency Services, but Pd happy to 
get back to the Committee. 
MARKS: 
with. 
plans for our marine terminals and offshore platforms, by our as 
should at this Section because it's existing law, and I don't 
We do have the Office of Emergency Services on our next panel, so maybe 
comment. 
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SENATOR MARKS: Mr. Trout, what have you found out as a result of the questions that I 
asked you? 
MR. TROUT~ The you referred to concerns oil and was into the 
at the time very crude carriers were being contemplated 
authorizes the Governor to create a State 
Commission, Resources Agency~ Department of Oil and Gas, Department of Fish and 
Office of Emergency Services; and they have been working with the various companies to 
Statewide Oil Spill Contingency Plan and plans for each individual oil 
terminals and platforms. I hope that answers your question. 
It 
Lands 
and 
a 
marine 
SENATOR MARKS: I'm sorry, that doesn't. The law says: You must file an oil spill 
Anybody who transports oil without such a plan approved the Secretary of Agency or 
designee is guilty of a misdemeanor. That's the law. Are you complying with the 
MR. TROUT: To the best of my knowledge, we are complying with the law through the 
Oil Contingency Group which is established in the Resources Agency which involves all the agencies 
that I mentioned. 
SENATOR MARKS: You received from each oil company an indication of what oil they're going 
to transport, yes or no? 
MR. TROUT: We have a contingency plan for each State platform and each marine terminal 
that's on State water. 
SENATOR MARKS: You're really not answering my question. It says an oil spill plan must be 
filed. Now, is an oil spill plan filed? 
MR. TROUT: Under the Oil Spill Plan, the State operating authority in charge is the 
of Fish and Game. It's always been our policy that the locai. government is in charge of 
the scene's operations, and State and Federal people support them. 
SENATOR MARKS: What did you do in the incident? What activity did you 
for those of you not in Northern California, was a very serious loss of a 
and a lot of oil. 
MR. TROUT: Senator, I'm sorry, I'm from the Los Angeles office, and I am not familiar with 
the activities up there. 
MR. TOM DUNAWAY: morning, Hart and members of the Subcommittee on Oil 
and Gas Development. I am the regional supervisor for operations, Pacific OCS Region, located 
in Los Angeles, California. 
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and amendments of 1978 authorize the of the 
Interior to administer the provisions of the Act pertaining to the leasing of the OCS and may at any 
time prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he deems to be necessary and proper to 
provide for the prevention of waste and conservation of natural resources. AdditionaHy, .•• the 
Secretary shall cooperate with agencies of the Federal Government and the affected states. The 
Secretary has delegated his authority to the MMS. For OCS operations off California, Oregon and 
Washington. MMS responsibility is carried out by the Pacific OCS Region in Los Angeles, and two 
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on two areas: first, give an overview of OCS oil and gas operations 
and second, highlight of MMS's responsibility for minimizing risk, 
with accidents on OCS. 
shelf, and that is the lands three miles on out. 
be taking place in the next fifteen years or so 
Maria Basin, we have analyzed current activities, proposed 
activities based on our current knowledge and current leasing. 
OCS operations are in Southern California. There are, in the Santa 
Maria Basin, 12 platforms and 1 o.ffshore storage and treatment vessel 
3 platforms currently being installed. Production averages currently 80,000 
are 2 mobile drilling units working in the Santa Maria Basin, and currently none 
Channel. 
include plans of development for 8 platforms that have or will be y 
MMS for review. These platforms will be installed over the next five years to 
estimated at 354,000 barrels of oil per day from the OCS. 
hypothetical activity is just a guess. However, our educated 
success or failure of exploration activities and future leasing 
on our more optimistic scenario is an additional 12 b 
326,000 barrels of oil per day. 
ocs 
80,000 barrels of oil/day 
ms 354,000 barrels of oil/day (peak 1990-1992) 
326,000 barrels of oil/day 
35 platforrns 164,000 barrels of oil/day (app. ! of 1990 peak) 
activity would remain fairly constant at between two and four 
time the Santa Maria Basin and/or the Santa Barbara Channel. 
and complete arsenal of laws and regulations, orders, and personnel to 
accidents in OCS operations. OCS Lands Act as arnended mandates 
to require the use of the best available and safest technologies 
22 to enforce safety and environmental regulations; specifically to 
safety equipment designed to prevent and ameliorate blowouts, 
major accidents, and periodic inspections without advance notice. Additionally, 
Secretary of Interior and the Secretary of the department in which the U.S. 
are given authority to promulgate regulations and investigate accidents. 
promulgated, in 30 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 250, entitled Oil and Gas 
_;_;_:;____;.;:c;..........;__"-"-....;;_;;;.;.....;;..;...;.,;;;._;;__.:..;...;;,.:;__;;;;_=-::.., requirements for leases, procedures for accident investigations, and 
violations. Next, the MMS has issued specific OCS orders that go 
on design, equipment, testing, and maintenance must used by 
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operators in the OCS. These are very similar to what Mr. 
Commission. 
We have one more significant area, and that is a 
in California must undergo this 
CHAIRMAN HART: Are those 
platform verification. 
MR. DUNAWAY: This is a Federal program. 
the 
CHAIRMAN HART: We have no platform verification requirements within State waters? 
MR. TROUT: I'm not sure what you mean platform verification. 
MR. DUNAWAY: Our platform verification program is three parts. It covers 
platform, the fabrication of a platform, and the installation of a The 
the a recommendation an independent in one of areas. 
of the 
to 
expert 
then goes onsite and monitors and reviews either design, fabrication, or installation of our 
platforms, prepares a report which is then submitted to the MMS. We have our own who 
review that report to see what indeed the design, fabrication, or installation of the structures are in 
accordance with appropriate standards. 
CHAIRMAN HART: So, Mr. Trout, to your knowledge is no such for program for the 
State? 
MR. TROUT: Well, we do have sor:1e activity. ru ask Torn to respond to that. 
MR. DUNAWAY: These orders also reference accepted industry standards, as A PI's 
recommended practices, National Electric Code, American Society of Mechanical Engineers' 
standards, and many more. Additionally, MMS issues safety alerts as a quick way of informing 
of accidents or of unsafe acts. 
To tie this all together, the MMS's Region has 14 utilizing three helicopters 
who are in the field a year. These men, who average more than fifteen years of 
inspect every OCS operation at least every two weeks or sooner, and visually 
witness and record the 
devices. 
of every safety device. Platforms may have over 1,000 such safety 
As I previously stated, Department of Interior and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) shared 
responsibilities and safety regulations and accident investigations to promote safety, avoid 
duplication, and less of Interior and U.S. Coast have 
signed a memorandum of understanding 1980. 
Briefly, the USCG is responsible for the design of floating personal safety, and has 
the in death and injury investigations. The MMS is responsible for design of fixed structures, and 
drilling and production systems, and has the lead in fire and explosions investigations. In the ific 
OCS, the MMS and Coast Guard have an excellent and arrangement. 
In 1969, the only significant accident (in the Pacific OCS) occurred: the Santa blowout. 
Since that time, over 500 wells been drilled, 300 million barrels of oil have been produced, with 
only 100 barrels spilled. Last year only 10 barrels were with cleaned up, and over 30 
million produced. This remarkably good record is due in part to the myriad of 
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dedication to safe operations. The MMS, the industry, 
want nothing less than the total commitment to safe, accident free operations. 
Thank you, Senator Hart, members of the Subcommittee. I am 
Manager with Exxon's Western Production 
our overall view of future oil and gas 
will address the potential risks of these operations and safeguards 
by the regulatory agencies and the industry to mitigate these concerns 
These concerns have been raised by projections of the future 
you've heard about already this 
statement.) 
ANDERSON: I am David Anderson, President of Get Oil Out. l 
statement. (See Exhibit "C" for the full statement from GOO.) 
the jurisdiction for dealing with such accidents? What is the 
industry and all levels of government? Who has the resources, 
Barbara County Emergency Services Coordinator 
- Regional of Region I, State Office 
Edward Grace - Chief of Marine Safety, 11th Coast Guard District 
Cudd- Environmental Task Force, Vandenberg 
-Santa Barbara County Fire Department 
Simons - Department Fish and Game 
iem for on/offshore emergency is serious. We work 
and 
and building hazards. We also hire to 
measures include: 
emergency operation plans to utilize our best available options and develop 
plans. 
Performing large-scale exercises and evaluations before and after the plan is adopted to 
concerns, roles, communications, technical aspects, and how to respond. 
oil industry's plan and interface it with the County's plan to identify aH 
and make sure oil companies are capable of responding. 
need better definition of on/offshore responsibilities in regards to offshore 
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emergency response. There is a need to assess how much we rely on State offices such as DES. 
CHAIRMAN HART: What's the worst case Does it deal with or 
technology? 
MR. Jurisdiction is our greatest problem; coordination and roles 
and actual emergencies is risky. 
CHAIRMAN HART: Does the State need to take more control? 
MR. LEE: The State's excellent. We need to have them define more roles. 
MR. JAMES ALEXANDER: The State DES has a small important role in the event 
spills. There is a warning control system in Sacramento, from which we notify the appropriate state 
and local agencies. The Department of Fish and Game is actually the lead state agency in case of oil 
spills. 
CAPTAIN EDWARD GRACE: The 11th Coast Guard District is responsible for 
prevention and pollution response in Southern California. The elements of doubling the number of 
rigs and increasing tanker traffic, expected groundingst fires, and spills have all become important, 
and the Coast Guard will have involvement in all of these activities. 
This morning I will limit my remarks to pollution response, because the Coast Guard will 
have an active role in this. Our jurisdiction comes from the Federal Water Control Act, where the 
Federal Government developed the National Contingency Plan, which is a joint efforl between the 
EPA and the Coast Guard with an understanding between the EPA, Coast Guard, Minerals 
Management Service, and several State agencies. However, the Coast Guard is responsible for 
coastal areas because we are the agency with preassigned Federal on-scene coordinators who are 
responsible for pollution incident response. 
On each level in the response community are jurisdictional matters that are generally spelled 
out in contingency plans. The first of those contingency plans is a national contingency plan. There 
are regional for each Federal region; and in each of these, on-scene coordinators are responsible 
local Each plan spells out a coordination procedure for communications, 
relations with industry, and for any other government agency that would be involved. This ranges 
from agencies to local county and city organizations. We do not have plans or describe in del ail 
what lockstep reactions have to be in a pollution incident. Each plan has to protect against 
unpredictable events. Any oil spill response always shows that that is the way a plan should be 
written. These plans also recognize an important point that the spill belongs to the 
government is to provide that the cleanup is accomplished. Therefore, spillers are required 
to respond first; the Coast Guard is basically a first-aid responder. type of spill that generally is 
assumed is a very large spill; tanker traffic, grid failures, etc. First-aid response could never be 
designed lo stop these kinds of spills, only to keep them under control until so\Oething can be 
Who is in charge? As stated below, the Coast Guard is responsible as the Federal on-scene 
coordinators to be in charge. In our position, we should monitor an industry's cleanup. If that doesn't 
happen, we take charge in cleanups. In that same act, we would not be involved with our own 
equipment; we would contract it out, except for our National Strike Team. 
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new 
if known, will be required to pay the bill 
Water Pollution Control Act would have to be used. I am not 
on the status of 
Budget cuts have on your ability to 
severe restrictions, the size to be determined cut. 
ing lanes mandatory, rather than advisory? Should we 
They are advisory. The effort to extend the lanes was modified six 
because there are no visual aids at that end of shipping lanes. 
To what extent are you familiar with the Clean Seas 
Seas ineffective? 
a physically difficult work space; containment 
What is the frequency of these rough conditions? 
Outer waters with 6-foot-plus seas occur 60 percent of the time or more. 
CUDD: Vandenberg Air Force Base has no jurisdiction offshore; therefore, 
nor any capabilities to respond to an offshore accident or incident. We 
between our fire departments and the County fire departments 
is geared to a large aircraft-type fire, or a structural or wildland 
to respond to a ship or offshore-type situation. Our hospital is a 
limited to stabilization of patients, as agreed with County 
with two to three med-tech crews available. Those 
on a platform or operating a rescue hoist, and we do have the capab 
water to assist anyone in the water, but this is basically a da 
to our command post. 
are 
PETERSON: Santa Barbara oil development is a novel thing for us to be 
we have taken an aggressive task, both onshore and offshore, and marine 
atte.11pt is to get zero loss through design, process controls, maintenance 
detection systems and suppression systems, both activated systems 
The standards that we have used are taken local 
industry standards. The concerns that we most 
low frequency, high magnitude events. So far, we have been successful in 
a fully equipped station at Gaviota for oil processing facility 
fully funded by the oil industry. We have fire protection safety plans on the 
require emergency response plans. We have a condition that would call 
which is a fireboat in this case. Our onshore firefighting system is 
systems employed with research determining what is available. 
marine firefighting is that the only capability locally is in San Francisco, and 
is not local. We have built-in systems which the vessels are required to have if 
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they are involved in picking up the product. The Francisco and are 
and would not be 
responsive to our concerns. We are concerned about situat 
and of conflicts In Santa we don't have or 
nor do we the 
the terminals will be in place, we hope to be able to concerns. 
CHAIRMAN HART: If a similar situation incident, how would 
we put out that fire? 
CHIEF PETERSON: Depending on where it occurred, if on or drifting would 
a local concern, we would be the lead agency. Again, we no 
of dealing with that. sea, it is Coast concern. 
MR. EDWARD SIMONS: I will comment on how Department of and 
with oil spills specifically. We have fallen into a role of response since the 1970s, after the 1969 
incident in this area. Today, we have more than 300 field officers throughout the of California. 
Southern California now has a spill response alternate to my position, Lt. Reed Smith in 
responsibility comes from the Oil Spill Plan which the 
State operating authority role and the State agency, coordinator role. In addition to 
enforcement on oil spills, as we have 1945. 
Our 
of the 
we 
According to Section 5650, it is a criminal misdemeanor. The fine is a very minor thing. But 
the offense is criminal, and therefore, does attract a lot of when it is used. We have 
Section 2014 which says for damages to the resources by an oil spill, there will be a civil recovery by 
the State of California and that is regularly enforced. Bill 686, we been given an 
order of Our are to prevent and minimize the effects of oil We 
containment devices around critical and and wildlife habit.als can 
the most. Our concern has in groups do for areas of critical 
ficance on the maps that use for responses; the and industry these 
maps. involved in the decision of whether or not to use dispersants to reduce the volurne of 
that reach an area. This has to be weighed biologically and what the effects of 
might be because if we 
moves somewhere else 
ashore. 
We also 
"'"''"""'"' the oil into the water column, the oil 
resources, even though we 
in rehabilitation of 
The oil then 
not as oil 
we have trailers 
the California Coastal prov us some Federal energy 
that have cleaning equipment in them. One of those is ered Barbara. 
We have three others up and down the coast. We are currently involved in 
Vandenberg to utilize their sewage treatement plant as a 
facility, with some monies we are trying to from various sources. 
We have also worked recently on sea otter 
otter range. We have three potential cleaning sites 
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a to 
coast in sea 
sea otters at 
Aquarium, and at our Department of Fish and 
Monterey. The problem with those is that we have no funds to buy 
We have been negotiating with the MMS offshore 
and included that money in there. 
is the official chairman of the Inter-agency 
This Committee of 13 State agencies is primarily 
State operating team gathers. This Committee has no 
plans. 
Bill 686 (Marks) and the funding mechanism of Senate Bill 
is happening in State oil and spill response. These give funds to the 
Oil Spill Committee. A study of dispersant and oit effects on 
biologists would like to look at a larval form that occurs off our coast, 
ocean waters. We could possibly match funds at this time 
provide a full set of maps for the coast of California, and a gas 
capability at our water pollution control lab in Rancho Cordova. This 
receiving Federal funding from the OCS AG monies. 
us 1,610 times in 1984 from their ocean controller with reports of sp 
State. 
Could you comment on the Puerto Rican incident? You 
is a spill. What happened with the Puerto Rican? 
of the emergency event went from the Coast Guard to 
Within 1! hours, we had half a dozen 
We had three days of the threatened spill. Initially we geared 
that there was no oil spill, but the vessel was 
are 
State had a limited jurisdiction. Three days later, the stern we 
by on-scene coordinator to use dispersants. At that point, 
though it was not in the territorial waters of California, dispersants 
!'-lational Contingency Plan. I was not available to determine the use of 
into sea otter range. 
ined agencies, Federal and State, at the request of the on-scene 
Bay, we held meetings on a daily basis and 
the oil appeared to be moving offshore rather than towards shore, so there was 
dispersants. Three days later, we had a phenomenon that is explained as a 
oil from its prior position, which was 20 to 24 miles southwest. In 
miles north. The next time the agency saw the oil, it was around the 
the real State response with State Parks working with our wardens 
bringing them into cleanup facilities. 
same time, we had active involvement of the Water Board and Fish and Game in 
Y of to be returned to port. We had a two-pronged spill here. In most spills, 
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the source is abated and everyone can concentrate on the cleanup. This is where we diluted our 
people because we responding to cleanup at the same time we were actively involved 
the State oil spill cleanup. We negotiated the conditions to be met for the forward part of that vessel 
to be brought back into State waters, eventually to San Francisco and to dry dock. took 
until November 18. There was not a day during this period that we did not have meetings. At this 
point, we were not getting new birds in for cleaning (although they were stockpiled). The 
cleaned up so this was possible, and the forebody was brought to the Bay. 
CHAIRMAN HART: Do you feel the jurisdictional roles were 
MR. SIMONS: I have been involved in one major spill (100,000-gallon spill in the Oakland 
estuary in 1973). In comparison, the coordination was equal or much better among agencies. It is 
still a situation where there is a limimted number of people who know what to do and they are 
physically overtaxed at this time. We had Coast Guard people who worked 36 hours straight. 
stresses our resources. 
Session II, Part B 
Hearing Participants: 
a 
Captain Vince Agapedo -Santa Barbara County Fire 
Marie DeSantis - Author and Writer for the National Fisherman 
Michael Herz - Tiburon Institute of Environmental Studies 
C. W. "Bud" Waage -Clean Seas 
Tim Rochte - California Conservation Corps 
- Councilman from Redondo Beach, SCAG 
Although all the questions are open for discussion, we were hoping there 
on questions such as: What are the technologies for dealing with such 
accidents? Who has it? How available is it? How are people trained to deal with oil spills and fires? 
CAPTAIN VINCE AGAPEDO: Fires may develop that are beyond the capabilities of built-in 
systems, and beyond the scope of firefighting government agencies. As stated earlier, the 
capabilities of government agencies in fighting fires is almost nonexistent. The County Fire 
Department does not have the equipment or the jurisdiction, and the Coast Guard or Office of 
Emergency Services does not have offshore firefighting capabilities. These services are provided by 
private enterprises called Hell Fighters (those professionals specializing in elimina! fires from oi 
and gas well blowouts, well fires, marine tanker fires, platform fires). A few of these companies 
include Red Adair, Boots and Coots, and Schmidt International. By way of example, I will the 
operations of Boots and Coots, Inc., based in Houston, Texas. 
If there were an offshore incident within Santa Barbara County, a jurisdictional agency would 
be responsible for setting up and maintaining a command system, logistical support, communications 
information. Boots and Coots provides specialized equipment and expertise in working in 
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ar 
have worked 22 incidents 
caches are in 
cache in Los Angeles comprised of a 
concentrate; associated application nozzles and 
Francisco and Texas. Upon requestt men 
equipment and provide a barge or 
can be loaded and secured. For an incident in 
to store an equipment ship. At the same time, 
architect from Virginia would be flown in. Once everyone is 
an attack would be made on the fire. The total response time is 
would require additional pumps from Texas. This would 
These are minimum estimates. 
to 
action 
Fighters can be judged as some of the best firefighters in the world. 
expertise, ability to work within a strict command organization, 
However, I am uncomfortable about relying on this system as it 
the limitations which are a result of the dependency upon the 
involved with equipment caches. 
local public decision makers must make some hard decisions upon 
whether they are acceptable. Santa Barbara County Fire Department 
questions and provide some of the solutions through proper 
process. 
technology capable to clean up an offshore oil spill 
the near future. Before documenting this 
common sense. A calm ocean is as smooth and workable as a 
can skim oil from a calm ocean. The difference between a 
it never stays that way for very long, particularly on the waters 
I 
ocean is experiencing even moderate winds and seas, it is to 
oil is churned up into the water. It should be obvious to everyone 
the salad dressing until someone stops shaking the bottle. not 
control over one who shakes the seas. 
more difficult to visualize, even in the most ordered seas, the waves 
across the sea; rather, the waves exist in herringbone patterns so even if 
is sitting on the crest of a wave, a long outrigger such as used on the 
ships, is likely to sit on the trough or another part of the wave, and this 
thrashing, and splashing of the boom through the water which is 
but skimming. This, remember, is an ordered sea. A sea condition is 
on waves, which superimpose on swells. So far no one has thought a 
such a surface. 
The vessel, Mr. Clean, built in 1978, 130 feet in length, is 
to both the Coast Guard and the oil 
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is the state-of-the-art vessel for 
barrels of oil were 
;_;.:;..;;___.;.---O.=..;. recovered a total 
take Mr. State-of-the-Art flat the 
next day, November 8, Mr. Clean reported he was to recover 
These weather conditions were 15- to winds and seas that were 5 to 7 feet. These sea 
conditions are medium to 
to the boom. From 
anchorages. In other words, to recover oil 
on the open sea conditions that were greater 2 it is 
state-of-the-art vessel. information I have given comes from on-scene report made the Coast 
Guard on the Puerto Rican spill. 
I think everyone in this 
if a 
is of the 
million 
and inventiveness of our 
dollars to 
walk on can walk on we 
can then believe that can walk on that is the source of our 
inventiveness. Thank you. 
DR. spent the last year at the 
because there is 
that I 
recommendations 
to 
came out of our 
on here which has 
the more 
we have made 
that should the case. We are a 
and the office 
here since before the turn of the 
the events of the ;_;;;.:.;::;.::.:::..:;:....:_:.:.;:;,;::~ 
th 
and say, 
taken care of 'thi~ and but 
seems that many of 
as 
area that hasn't even 
been look at offshore oil 
a number 
to what 
said 
into his 
see 
occurrence of _..;;..;;_;;..o;_,_.;.;~"-' even is one 
Bay, outward 
a large, massive and 
the focus of the Coast Guard and 
lost. A 
vessels 
who was 
the first few hours 
the scene 
ready to off the 
and 
and the 
when 
the 
A 
a 
scene. 
water and 
rescue underway and lives saved. Then the 
the sea conditions were quite moderate, 
was a pre-World War II tugboat converted to a 
time in its history to fight the fire. It 
had to retire. The Navy sent two 108-foot 
a failure of its mast that raises nozzles up into 
so they were out of commission. During this 
Marin Headlands; and fortunately, a vessel of 
to get a towline on the stern and tow it offshore. 
while the vessel was under tow, it was leaking oil, 
Guard set up a prohibited area within which they did not want 
F ara11on Islands and Pt. Reyes Marine Sanctuary, and west 
unclear, these towing boundaries were violated for 12 hours 
coast. 
broke in two, and the stern sank within the sanctuary. case, 
to 35,000 barrels of oil. The oil, during the first three days, did as 
and moved south, but then there was this mysterious 
the oil reversed direction and moved 24 miles north, wrapped 
is the centerpiece of the Marine Sanctuary, set aside 
referred to, was, first of all, a Southern 
explosion and took 24 hours to get to San Francisco. a 
was described as a freak wave. The harbor master says it was out 
operators were unfamiliar with the area. She was out 
or four days and not available to do skirnming. 
days after the oil turned north, there was some cleanup attempted; but as 
percentage of the oil spill was cleaned up. Some of 
Harbor. Five thousand birds were oiled k 
in terms of a worst case scenario, it does not approach the 
a worst case, yet we had a lot of problems. 
explosion is believed to be that surface plating over a tank was 
soda leaked around the tank. Static electricity sparked the explosion 
as if it were a hinged trapdoor. Recommendations for the future are: 
we 
firefighting capabilities. Multipurpose vessels such as developed 
oil fields, a vessel that is 150 to 200 feet long which is capable 
cleanup capability, and tankage capacity, must be quickly on the 
up was that the barges we used for holding the skimmed-up oil 
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are not preferred offshore. When Mr. Clean filled up, it did not have any place to pump its oil and 
had to go all the way back to San Francisco to 800 it was 
also difficulty in lack of compatibility of hoses between vessels that were cleaning up oil and 
barges holding the oil. The equipment must be on the scene it must be 
We found, as the was around, after the existed no 
designating areas in which you might tow a disabled vessel if it lost power or is on fire. must 
be less sensitive areas. 
There is not a good understanding of the current move oil up and down 
What carried the oil 24 miles north in the Puerto Rican incident was a phenomenon that happens 
annually. We have two coastal current regimes; a California current that moves south during 
spring and summer, and the Davidson current that moves the fall and winter. This 
changeover phenomenon was in the process of occurring, and it should have to 
because of the wind shift 12 hours before the current shift. It could have been possible to some 
booms out at the Farallons to prevent damage to that habitat. 
Our recommendation for the oceanographic community is that we need to have research 
programs to better understand these offshore currents that move the oil in and out and up and down 
our coast so that we can make accurate predictions. Ideally~ we should some 
record wind and barometric pressure and current directions so we know what is going on. 
We feel that it is the responsibility of the industry to pay for the research and 
because the industry is making money moving the oil back and forth. Ultimately, the consumers will 
have to pay part of that but it seems that the to these resources and the 
coastline is a cost of business. 
of resources has been done here to a better extent than in Northern California. 
However, it is one thing just to map the resources, but the second step is to set up a mitigation 
response program. If you have identified a delicate habitat or area of significance, or area 
is you want to note that it is vulnerable have the equipment and people trained 
to coming ashore in that area. 
In response to coordination and communication, we are concerned about the situation when the 
Coast Guard set boundaries to not have the vessel towed in, but they were violated. There is a 
with having an unseen coordinator, and explicit orders should be written and a 
backup person to be present to enforce these 
Again, I was surprised to see how vulnerable you are with extensive production already on. 
(For a more complete discussion of the Puerto Rican episode, see Exhibit "E".) 
COUNCILMAN AHCHIE SNOW: I am also a member of the Planning Commit t F)e for 
Los County, and we feel that this oil production will be a major for us. 
Every community in California is supposed to have an I don't know 
many coastal commmunities a plan, but the Office of Emergency Services should 
mandate that all communities, whether on the ocean or waterways, have some sort of in 
event that there is a of oil or toxic substances in their waters. 
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of Governments) is responsible for the 
transportation plan, and acts as a clearinghouse for 
and transportation background, SCAG is vitally concerned 
risk management as being discussed at this 
the crude by pipeline from Santa 
there are significant factors involved 
not be ignored. 
pipeline requires blending the oil with natural gas liquid or heating 
easier through the pipeline. This pipeline is going through the permitting at 
process presents a potentially serious public hazard. 
or explosions should be planned for early in the design 
pipeline will be 130 miles long, pass through 12 cities and 18 
areas. This pipeline must be structurally sound and consideration must be 
areas. 
present risks. The best way to deal with this is a thoroughly tough env 
way will the possible risks associated with a ruptured pipeline kept to 
need an adequate study of define all the risks associated with 
experience with OCS and EIS/EIRs have not been good. SCAG does not 
accurately provide the full information and effects. A big problem is 
in documents, such as "best available technology". Who defines 
State shoutd be lead agency in regards to worldwide 
pipelines. 
also need more time to prepare for this development 
we want it or not. (For complete test, see Exhibit "L".) 
EIRs too technical? 
we cannot understand their technical jargon. We do not 
to decipher these reports. 
(Please see Exhibit "F" for the statement from Clean 
I am the area manager of the California Conservation Corps for the 
to Pt. Conception. 
Code enforces the CCC and employs 2,200 young 
public conservation works. We also assist public agencies in emergency 
supplies a disciplined and energetic source of workers to the benefit of 
As such, we are a support rather than a lead agency. 
capability, we have usually been involved with fires, floods 
have also had direct experience with oil spills, and I have led two 
four years. 
occurs, the is dispatched through the local county emergency services 
a public agency. The CCC can immediately to 
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most coastal areas of California within one to four the call. closest to 
this area (Santa Barbara) and would be the 
depends on the size of the incident. 
tools. 
In the years, the CCC has 
can 
uniforms and basic 
We were involved Luis Obispo Creek in San Luis Obispo County involving 
cleanup of water from the Puerto Rican incident. creek cleanup operations, our crew was 
responsible for removing oil from the creek bed shore. 
six weeks to clean it up. The August, 1985 oil spill involved 30 staff workers in a three-week 
In the Puerto Rican incident, the CCC was for collecting, and 
water fowl. One 15-person crew worked for two weeks on that 
Our goal is to respond to emergencies quickly deal with bureaucratic matters later 
billing sources after commencement). As far as training goes, it has been y Oil in 
San Pedro, a few years ago. We also receive specialized training by onsite experts. Our Corps 
members and staff are well-trained in disaster relief of all sorts, and they are capable of any clean-
up operation. 
Session III 
What are the best measures to prevent such What 
What training is needed and what inspection procedures should be followed? In 
discussion, what 
gas-related accidents? 
actions should be taken to reduce and to 
Commission 
on Marine Safety 
- U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, 
Research 
Gordon Cota -
Jerry 
Barbara 
Dr. Floyd Tuler - Worcester 
Marine 
Dr. Armand - UCSB Marine Institute 
Clair - Chevron 
Robert Sollen - Sierra Club 
Martha Blum - League of Women 
MS. SUSAN HANSCH: The California Coastal Commission is 
in offshore gas and oil operations. has jurisdiction over the 
in 
be 
the risks of oil- and 
with the 
of 
area. 
were 
F 
Federal waters. Before any exploratory or developmental 
must find that the project is consistent with the resource protection policy 
Act does define the offshore energy development as coastal dependent and 
operations as priority uses. The Act does require the Commission to 
are mitigated to the maximum extent feasible and 
location. The Commission has vigorously addressed the 
spills and accidents by requiring specific mitigation measures for 
equipment~ training facilities for the California Maritime Academy and the 
done by all State, local and Federal agencies, but there is 
equipment is critical. This equipment must be continuously 
that uses this equipment must be fully trained and tested for 
tanker and offshore facilities must be regular to correct equipment problems 
CCC calls unannounced oil spill drills. These are a critical hands-on test 
personnel. All existing techniques is not enough -- oil spill equipment is only 
seas. When resources are especially valuable, it is sometimes better for the public 
One of the biggest challenges facing Federal, State and local governments 
oil and gas production and transportation is cumulative impact; that is, 
of offshore drilling and tankering. There is a strong need for overall to 
impacts and establish acceptable thresholds and risks. 
focus of today's hearing is offshore risks, I think it is important to stress 
as well. Any legislation or overall planning for offshore fac 
account the associated onshore facilities. 
ROGALIN: In reference to earlier testimony about the dangers or lack 
transport of molten sulfur, I would like to mention the incident in the San 
was an accident with a truck carrying molten sulfur from a refinery in Benicia, and 
to the National Academy of Sciences in the period of 1969 to 1979, there were, in 
collisions with platforms; 11 of these produced structural damage, 3 were 
are used in risk management depends on where you stand. In a recent 
of a vessel in port were given at the highest as once in 80 
a newspaper could list three explosions in U.S. ports within a few years. 
measures to prevent such accidents involve good training, inspection and 
fire departments must board tankers and check inert gas systems. Inert 
properly and that requires specialized training, which is not expensive or long to 
provide for inspections by local fire departments before unloading begins. 
inspections and emergency evacuations should be practiced on offshore facilities. 
accidents should also be analyzed. This equipment is needed: 
a minimum of 6,000 to 12,000 gallons per minute systems to deliver water to the 
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deck of burning platforms or tankers. They should be under 
Fire Department. 
There should be of 
There must be adequate 
discharge 90 
Necessary legislative action include 200-mile 
and waterways standards, and providing the Coast Guard with 
The State should require fireboats and rescue at all ports. 
Comprehensive disaster plans should be mandated for all 
operations. 
of 
CHAIRMAN Have these recommendations advocated in 
MS. ROGAUN: Many of the equipment recommendations been 
Santa 
involved in 
MR. MAURICE SCHERB: I have been a consultant on marine for many years, 
y 
to make these points. Management must responsible safety. Reliable data banks can provide 
early warning systems which allow you to catch a problem before it develops into a disaster. Black 
box recorders help trace down complications. They should onshore as well as on ships. \Ve 
imnprove initial designs, rather completed 
MR. CARMEN PIZZARIELLO: CAOHF (Computer Aided Hesearch at the 
United States Merchant Marine Academy has been in since 1976. We have 
handling simulation that can simulate any vessel in any area. By model problems, 
such as the movement of ships, and simulating the perspective of a captain on a we can record 
and data with the most sophisticated simulation to reduce risks involved in 
This can develop more reliable and vessels contributes to 
levels of can be quantified. for a statement on the of 
MR. My fishing involves transit near the shipping and I would to 
say that American vessels we deal with have professional, sophisticated, and well-trained 
mariners. unfortunately; ships come through with no crew and is 
our problem. I would like to that in transit through the Channel, someone on the 
In the past, I did not encroach on best il 
does not do any good if human are made. 
Where are the What is the minimum level we will 
MH. best measure for preventing such accidents is to have a 
comprised of operators, and 
others within the area that require some input to This group of 
can work together to guidelines, terminal and a general source of 
caring for the environment. The Port of Valdez is a of such an organization. 
We have the to meet the needs of safe and marine 
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one any system is the human element. The best we 
and hope that they can react wisely in time of emergency or normal 
competent workers. 
compromised. Officers and terminal operators must be trained to 
have firefighting schools and in-house 
and improvements made. spill 
are sufficient. Terminal regulations and oil 
y to successful operation is solid cooperation. 
ARMAND: Thank you, Senator Hart. If the mike works, I 
very briefly the subject of research in the area of safety 
operations. 
industry began off the coast of California nearly one hundred years ago 
over water was drilled from a wharf in Summerland in 1887) before going through 
are witnessing today. California has watched all this activity, but with a 
to take a very active part in the associated technology, which is most 
The engineering challenges to be met in order to insure safety 
as oil and gas exploration and exploitation lie at the frontiers of 
fields of investigation. 
is to be compared with the situation of Norway. Ever since 
in the North Sea, Norway has made it mandatory for the 
contribute to a research fund for improving safety and 
level is used for research which is, for the most part, conducted 
a county with less than 5 million inhabitants, has during the 
undisputed world leader in the advanced aspects of offshore technology. The 
Classification Society, Det Norske Veritas, for the design, construction, 
of offshore structures, originally developed for the harsh North 
are now enforced worldwide. Norway is also consulted whenever a disaster takes 
and asked to draw the lessons which would, hopefully, prevent 
mishaps. All this started only 15 years ago. 
nature of offshore operations varies greatly from one geographical area to 
the subject of specific studies. The University of California with 
at Berkeley, San Diego (Scripps), and Santa Barbara, possesses an 
Engineering, which in the nation today, only MIT and Woods Hole can possibly 
It is to be hoped that research in the area of safety and reliability of offshore oil and 
now only timidly supported, will be strongly encouraged in the near future by Federal 
as well as by oil companies. It is after all in the best interest of this country to 
an appropriate technological know-how. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
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CHAIRMAN HART: Thank you, Professor. Can you tell me a little more about the tax 
mechanism in Norway and how that Testimony was that Norway a that when there 
is development that takes place; the oil companies are basically in some 
money goes for research ••• 
DR. ARMAND: ••. That is some of the tax. They are taxed in have 
right to driU and to operate in the Norwegian waters. But the point is that some of this tax is 
directed to extensive research, which has put Norway in the forefront of research and know-how in 
offshore engineering. 
CHAIRMAN HART: And we have no such requirement or taxing authority here in this country? 
DR. ARMAND: Well, right now research is supported by, but I say, very 
NOAH, USCG, and oil companies, which all do their own "'''"''"'<"'"'h There is no combined to 
make all of these results available. Oil companies know their stuff very well, they do own 
research, and they usually do not make the results available to the public nor to other research 
agencies. 
CHAIRMAN HART: What area of research do you feel is most promising or most in need of 
attention as it relates to our own oil development procedure here in Southern California? Is 
anything that stands out that you think is particularly pressing in terms of research that you 
needs to be done at this point in time? 
DR. ARMAND: Well, the point I am trying to make is that has 
evolved in the past few years, and we now have no solutions, but we have ways of approaching 
problems which are new. Some of them came from the nuclear industry, and a of them from 
aeronautics (it was mentioned a few minutes ago that a tremendous effort for safety reliability 
taking in aeronautical engineering, which is correct). 
SENATOR MARKS: How big is the tax? What percent is it is it high? 
DR. ARMAND: I do not have the exact figures, but I can assure you the 
conducted by Det Veritas and by the University of Torendine in area of 
reliability alone is in the area of $50 million a year. 
SENATOR MARKS: I would think, and nobody likes to pay taxes, but I would think that if the 
oil companies were assured that this would be helpful to them, as well as helpful to their co 
that they might not object to some form of tax, if it were not too Now, 
sometime talk about it. It would seem to me that if the oil companies are now for 
own research, it might be an advantage to them to join together and to conduct research. I 
really appreciate it if somebody would comment on that. 
MR. DUNAWAY: Independent research going on at the same time by many different 
produce a large amount of difference in approaches and ideas to problems that would be lost under 
one research organization. Many inputs means more ideas. Whenever an agency a new 
technology it can be opened up to other companies to make sure all have this new technology. 
SENATOR MARKS: I would seem to me that. if companies were to support in some way (I am 
not suggesting a heavy tax), organizations such as the Coast Guard that are helpful to that it 
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Professor Marshall Tulin had hoped to give this presentation 
record, and I am happy to read it for him. He is a 
Exhibit 'tt-l" for Professor Tulin's letter.) 
I want to thank again all our panelists for being with us today, 
are some additional questions that are 
now to come forward. They are: Dr. Floyd Tuler 
Mr. Robert Solten of the Los Padres Chapter of the Sierra 
Barbara League of Women Voters. 
Thank you, Senator Hart and members of the Subcommittee. My 
a professor in the Mechanical Engineering Department at 
Worcester, Massachusetts. I am pleased this day to get the ,_,..,"'"'" 
you, and in passing, I would like to mention that I am 
to this area where I used to live for a number of years. 
to make some comments concerning the use of risk analysis 
management, both in the United States and abroad. These comments come 
conducted at MIT about four years ago, and supported by the MMS a 
Laboratories. The findings and opinions are solely mine and 
in this area have continued, and I am currently conducting a 
of lvtexico. Our studies of the potential and the limitations 
environmental management suggests certain policy 
private operators, and other parties 
regulatory agencies to help set priorities for 
requirements, and for establishing new regulations to 
For example, as discussed earlier, the overall 
coast might be improved by studies of the potential conflicts between 
ing lanes in the region. These methods can also be used for 
they are achieving their goals. There have been 
ships for North Sea platforms. Previously, 
as oil companies, drilling contractors, equipment designers, 
their use of probablistic methods in their studies of new systems 
could help and make their operations safer and less costly in 
workers, and the environment. Furthermore, in addition to just publishing 
the assumptions and methods of such studies would provide for criticism and 
public concerns about offshore hazards. 
interest organizations and local government should also be alert to the 
use of these formal methods of analysis may present to them. If properly 
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used, such methods offer the hope of better control of low probability, high consequence event of 
the sort that so often motivate opposition to offshore and other projects. It is for 
such groups to learn how risk analysis works 
participants and critics of its use. 
how it is so they may become 
We should realize that risk analysis is not a panacea for the management of any 
offshore oil development or safety control, and it should be considered for use with 
its strengths and its limimtations. 
awareness of 
There appears to be little basis for imposing on and requiring operators and other 
they carry out formal risk analysis of all projects on a routine basis. Instead, at the current state-of-
the-art technique, and of its practice in the United States, risk analysis is a tool that should be 
reserved for use in exceptional circumstances. For most applications, the use of risk anal has 
tended to focus the attention of analysts and decision makers on low probability, high consequence 
events. Because risk analysis is oriented towards catastrophic events, it is unreasonable to expect 
that it can substitute for the more traditional types of safety and environmental studies that tend to 
focus on more likely events that could happen everyday. But these traditional methods are 
inadequate for addressing these most catastrophic losses, thus the two approaches can best be viewed 
as being complimentary. 
It should be noted that risk analysis is not just another technique of analysis like others used by 
good engineers. Because it is based on analysis of probabilities, it involves an entirely different 
mind-set from the deterministic methods that are traditionally used. Prerequisites to 
effective use of risk analysis is the willingness to accept the fact that nearly anything can happen at 
some level of probability, but that not all such events are equally probable or equally damaging. 
Finally, you may wish to consider more far-reaching changes in the regulatory system that 
would take advantage of the power of formal risk analysis. Used properly, risk analysis can allow for 
more effective regulation of safety and environmental risks, while allowing industry 
ility in the selection of available technology and operation methods, and while assigning more of 
the responsibility for the effective control of hazards to the operating company. 
This might be done for example by adapting the self-regulation approach known in Norway as 
internal control, or by requiring that operators adopt a formal program of quality assurance. 
the system of internal control, operators must fulfill a set of overall procedural require:nents for 
safety management that substitute for the estimate and oversight of detailed design and operat 
rules by regulatory authorities. As compared with more traditional approaches towards regulation, 
this system involves substantially less day-to-day oversight of company operations regulator 
authorities, while it strengthens the accountability of operators for the consequences of 
activities through full public disclosure. 
Clearly, as we have heard today, the rapid increase in offshore activity in Santa Barbara 
overtax the regulatory and emergency response agencies. Fewer regulations require fewer regulatory 
staff that are needed if every installation is supervised by government representatives. Nevertheless, 
all offshore designs and operations should be made subject to random spot checks by authorities. 
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area, 
a key role determining whether a proposed design is 
levels of acceptable risk set forth by the regulating agency. 
internal control requires that a level of acceptable risk be specified so 
have taken the steps necessary to design an acceptable system an 
a of acceptable risk has proven to be 
United States for regulating nuclear power. 
can be estimated for offshore activities in the California 
use of risk analysis as a tool for identifying and mitigating hazards 
both opportunities and potential problems for all the parties 
However, increased use of these techniques can, I believe, 
Thank you. 
GHYLIN: Thank you, Senator Hart and members of the Committee, 
today. With your permission, I would like to submit a 20-page 
and just briefly make a couple of comments. 
I am the General Manager of Land for Chevron in the San 
in California and have participated in offshore matters for more than the 
the general tone of the hearing of the conciliatory and cooperative is 
an indication that we will continue to try to resolve the problems of offshore 
mutual meetings such as this, and I commend the Committee for 
spoke about marine terminal laws and regulations, and I would like to 
production of platforms and things related to that, although I think I 
that he reached: that we have enough laws and regulations, and we 
toward further cooperation between the governmental agencies, industry, 
to voluntarily, and through cooperative programs, install 
as far as safety or pollution control. 
I many of our difficulties have occurred because of the number 
jurisdiction problems that have been created by overlapping Federal, and 
statement that will be filed with you, for instance, I list the 34 Federal laws that 
our operations in the Federal waters. Many of these were addressing individual 
individual Federal agencies; and many of them were passed 
impact or effect on other Federal laws, or State or local laws. We would 
to use the existing process, and the existing regulatory agencies, if possible, to add or 
any of the risk analysis of safety programs you are considering. 
was by an earlier speaker was the flexibility of existing 
have changing environments and changing technology. For example, the 
Barbara, in its regulatory regime, has imposed on my company at the Pt. Arguello 
says "if at any time the County determines that these permit conditions are 
effectively, significant, environmental impacts caused by the project, or that 
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recent proven 
is an 
have the 
the kinds of advance 
conditions. 
is understandable when you 
project, which was 
for our Pt. 
the 
the first half of 1978, at time a series 
and conditions were imposed on the leases to 
that were talked about here today. 
Following the sale in 
process for 
Those studies went 1977 and 
EIS was adoptedt 
many of the risks 
for the purpose 
of immediately Coastal Commission and to D.O.I. to 
wells. Those environmenta 
the middle 1980, time the State 
It was lB months of studies 
resulted in the 
as part our 
Santa Barbara as 
at any of the times 
of how the 
at that before we 
that was by the oil 
interested in your comments. 
who on oil 
in California -- we 
are of danger to their own 
not be some 
who are 
and resolution 
y can 
y 
on these 
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the middle of 1979 
and 
of 
That was in 
the example 
and 
manner. We 
in 
of those 
of 
that we 
are 
Ms. Guzman 
between the 
is an 
irne ago 
why, but I would 
license almost else 
e'lvironrnent. 
concerns 
defer to tv1r. Dunaway, but let me say that I think is 
objective of the that we are all equally concerned primarily 
I think problem we see is another 
training programs for all personnel. There are 
carry a certification card. 
The State also has training programs, more stringent than those 
and a daily drill is required. 
the use drugs on platforms? Are inspectors looking 
but the MMS feels that oil companies are primarily responsible for 
Are there Federal regulations about whether drugs or 
if they are illegal, obviously -- but about whether alcohol is 
We do not have a specific requirement, .... 
are 
on 
company does, and I believe all the other companies operating in the 
prohibitions against drugs and alcohol while on the platforms. The 
some prescription drugs, and those are very limited and monitored. Usually the 
to 
Thank you, Senator Hart. Let me say, first of all, that I am 
Chapter of the Sierra Club, which is the local chapter, and that 
approved in principle by the local chapter, but there was not to run it 
and bureaucracy of the Club, so this does not necessarily 
policy. (See Exhibit "K" for the Sierra Club statement.) 
you, Mr. Sollen. Let me just ask you one question. Based on 
statements that we already have enough regulations, they would have some 
some of your proposals. I would like to ask you if you would view these 
as ones that would be added to the existing framework or regulations, or do you see 
way being to substitute for some of the existing regulations? That 
is already so much overlap and so many different requirements we 
as as to with some of the issues that have to our 
I am interested in streamlining. I do not know of any additional requirements 
in place. The conditions put in place by the County, for instance, are very 
are volumes of conditions numbering into the hundreds. My point is that putting 
not mean they are going to be enforced, and I do not propose new agencies or 
What I propose is a joint powers agreement among existing agencies, 
of any new ones. 
me again to summarize what you are saying: That problem is 
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not so the existing 
often Lhe enforcement 
the SLr that may 
aut 
MR. 
:nenl today. It cannot 
You three more 
of interest. 
to enforce t 
with the most authoriit y is the C::oast which does not have to this three-mile 
the f).Q.I. has territorial line, but other 
up. 
MRS. MARTHA UM: 
Barbara. We thank you for 
making that makes our nnvA·rnr-n 
The has 
vast increase in oil 
updates, and 
allow little time for sound 
County 
basis, but in looking at 
effect of oil and gas 
ies to do these 
uncertainty and fear of what 
and authorit 
of our and our 
recommendations: 
L Coordination of 
au!horit 
for 
We 
to 
3. We 
air 
the increase 
am 
situation in the 
cases, the overall 
is necessary. 
in 
and Federal 
we 
for accidents 
to help this process. The State has 
the also 
Commission leaves 
the a 
open 
accountable. 
Channel. In prepar,qt ion for the 
lost. A look at the 
our County into 
has observed 
the environ 
r 
some 
in 
balances 
Guard 
the vol.t~rs 
but we 
to 
Thank you. Any questions? All right, thank 
now who we have asked to speak, and we can just have come 
will be Horace Pennington. 
afternoon. My name is Horace Pennington 
are a new company in Ventura, and we are here in 
California. We have developed a new safety product that we would 
pamphlets that we have introduced to this panel, and also to the MMS 
of the drill stem during offshore drilling, hydraulically. At 
is manually, and we are trying to show that we are in support of 
to prevent catastrophic situations. I will have a pamphlet in the 
I would like to ask just one question. Has this product been adopted by 
At this time, no, sir, it has not. We are in the process ••• 
MARKS: Has it been presented to them? 
Yes, sir. It was presented to them originally in 1981 when our original 
only manufacturer in the world that manufactured such an item. It was not 
there are two competitors who do manufacture this item. We feel 
safety features of it ••.• 
All right, very good. Thank you. George Silva? 
of the Subcommittee, I am George Silva. I have had over ten 
planning at the local government level. I am currently 
to emergency management systems. Because of the lateness of the 
very brief. 
to sell you anything other than, perhaps, a concept. What I would like 
address what I believe to be the fundamental issue of this particular hearing. It 
have of all types of risks, mostly engineering risks, some 
there are three types of risks that we as human beings 
we recognize them or not, that in fact exist; known risks, those things that 
we are convinced they are risks; and finally, perceived risks, whether actuai or 
to 
it was disclosed that a great deal of effort, as well as a great deal of money, has 
to provide answers to many apparent risks posed by oil and gas development and 
offshore and onshore. I would like to address my comments in the broader sense, 
County. We are concerned from a risk standpoint of onshore, as well as 
of oil and gas development. As someone put it this morning, we are learning answers 
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to risk 
future. 
and I believe that to be true, and we will learn a more answers in he 
However, even though we are 
I am not convinced that we have 
answers 
for more of 
understood the 
that 
risks that we deal with in this area? And, what is the importance of each of 
have heard discussed vessel collision risks; with vessel, vessel with 
risks, explosion, fire, operator failure, and numerous other risks. are 
liowever, are they the total picl ure of risks by the future oil and gas 
coast and the processing facilities on the coast in the e of 
l Jnt l vvG have an all 
development, we will not be assured that we are 
recommend lo this SubcommiU ee that you give to recommend 
that part of the revenues that will be realized relative to oil and gas 
to 
1cern. 
lure 
agree. 
off the 
!hi 
thercforr~ 
ure 
some of 
the Federal impound funds could be permitted to a 
energy development as it relates to the State of California. 
risk anal of 
What are the benefits that derived from such a (I am not 
referring to an engineering study or a y study, but rather a 
believe the of such a study would be not only the communi 
industry, with a comprehensive understanding what we will be with the 
making it possible for a more effective commitment of all of our resources, and 
address those risks that are of concern. Of course, we deal wi and we have 
used word today From a commercial course, mit ion 
generally on 
y 
From 
equally conducted 
not occur in the future. 
y, mi 
risks 
wants to 
undesirable consequencen, and that 
the facility at its maximu11 with minimum 
most would like that 
in with the possib that certain occurrences 
We have identified all of the reasonable I have addressed them in 
advance. I might call to your ::~tt ention that I that in most chemical ion 
world i oday, that the oper::~tors arfl much better lo deal wi 
meth as a result of Bhopal. I am not sure that most major 
throughout lhe world and have identified may be. The y 
route to doing that is to do a comprehensive risk in alL of the 
undesirable consequences, use an appropriate matrix determine all 
concern, and then prioritize them so that the community, and t can then those 
issues appropriately. not mitigate the ility of their occurrence, but should a 
catastrophe occur, that both industry and the community is deal with 
Therefore, I recommend that some of the revenues be committed b the State 
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is 
numerous 
where 
a which would then be of use to all 
certainly to the industry. Thank you. 
Thank you very much. Michael McDermott. 
OTT: Good afternoon, Senator Hart and members of 
Barbara~ and I am a 1979 graduate of the California State 
an unlimited Mate's license in the United States 
to offer some points of insight based on my years of experience as a watch 
cargo officer on West Coast tankers. 
prepared statements; instead, I have tried to respond to some of the 
so I will bear with me if I am a little 
Earlier on, there was a point made of requiring on-board 
As one of my old navigation instructors often informed us, most 
aid on bridge of a ship is the Mark One eyeball. It is just 
behind those eyballs that are becoming the subject of greater fatigue, stresses, 
to a a number of factors; many of them tied to the economic plight of the 
is the watch standing structure. Current Coast Guard and 
(IMO) regulations call for three watches for three mates -- 4 on and 8 hours 
in the Merchant Marine, this procedure is being changed as 
comes into port, it has to do a lot more work. I should explain the 
a officer, a second officer, and two 3rd officers stand the nav 
hardships that have come on, they have eliminated the second 3rd 
mate in the watch rotation. 
good if he stands his watch. Unfortunately, when you come on 
increased workload. This has led, while still on the roster as maintaining a 
to the and third officer relieving each other, standing 6 on and 6 
you are stressing the people far beyond their limits, and this is going on, depending on 
for several weeks without end. 
problem that is faced is decision making at sea. In the oil business paychecks 
have someone making a decision who has their paycheck show up from 
concerns are going to become a little clouded; and if 
where do their loyalties lie? If they vote for safety, who is going to take care 
payments? 
may come into play in issues such as loading and discharge regulations. Also when 
- we have been talking about disabled vessels off the coast. There are 
history where masters have actually procrastinated to the point 
ships go around in order to not let their vessels be taken as salvage, and hopefully, 
on a contract to show up. There is a very big difference. If a tug contracts to 
a set If someone comes and salvages your vessel, they basically own 
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vessel. There is a great economic disincentive to let someone have salvage of 
desperate the situation. Once again, the people mak these decisions at re on 
1 hroughout this industry have two bosses: saff~t y and work considerations, And they have lhe fa,;t 
they have to keep their job. 
Earlier there was some talk about radios, who participates, who and so forth. 
found hat on the West Coast about two-thirds of the time you call somebody you can !o an 
answer. If you know who you are calling, if you can identify them, you can get a response. Ot 
areas of the country, it is much worse. One concern I have currently is in the Gulf Coast. The radio 
channels are currently a nightmare. On the prime navigation and emergency channels, Channel 16 
and so forth, you have basically, well, I won't describe who they are, but you have people 
country and western 1nusic, jokes, and just about carrying on their radio DJ prm;,ra:ns on he 
navigation frequency. This has not gotten that bad on the West Coast, but the influx of crew 
supply boats, and so forth, coming frorn the Gulf, may very well change that situation. 
Once again, back to the subject of radios and collision avoidance in general, the rules of the 
road, radio traffic are designed for intership - ship to ship. When you run into a situation when you 
have four to five different ships, perhaps it is nighttime so you are not able to identify which you 
are calling, you start to play a game running between the radar and the radio set I o see who am 
talking to, give him a bearing back and forth, it can become a very confusi'lg situation very y, 
nnd that can add to a lot more stress. 
Point 2 gets into traffic. There has been a lot of talk about the traffic lanes off the coast. 
There has been very little talk about the traffic separation, or the precautionary zone at Pt. 
Concept ion and Pt. Arguello. The traffic lanes basically end at Pt. Conception, and there you t 
from very rational, ordered, divided traffic flow into a helter skelter transit area where y 
its. You have traffic coming from the north, from lhe Far-East, fro•n Alaska, and you have traffic 
leaving the Los Angeles Basin and corning out of the traffic lanes. Everybody is !)Ding his own way 
and there is no control, no guidance in this area. This is just the area that a lot 1nore are 
put in right now. 
That gets into another area of rules of the road, traffic separation schemes, and y 
conflict with the laws of physics from time to time. We heard people talking of smaller vessels 
bigger vessels. 
II takes a long disUmce to stop a ship, and thai is if you am prep;m~d to do t. : Jsunl !y ! he: 
vessels opera! ing the Channel are operating at sea speed, which means that their engineering 
Bre turned up for maximum efficiency, and they cut in extra burners if L1ey have got boilers, or y 
have <::JOt it down into a routine for high speed long distance running. If you have lo maneuver, you 
have lo come out of that and then down into your maneuvering mode and then try to stop your vesneL 
Correspondingly, if you are entering port, you are also going to be maneuvering. This is the t irne l hat 
the most engineering c3suallir~s take place, when you are making changes in your pl::mt. 
Safe! y zones are very nice unless the vessel loses power. I have been on a 70,000-pound tanker that 
lost power off of Pt. Reyes. Vve were seven miles off of Pt. Reyes; the vessel had about 5 
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was no to even move that without going through a long laborious process 
we would end up coming to a dead stop on a calm day three 
opposite direction. We just made one very long run. So a thousand-yard 
a whole lot of good if you have a casualty of any sort. 
one so far in the chemical dispersant studies had mentioned most 
common dispersant used in the oil industry today, and I am talking about liquid dishwashing 
=-::...:...:...;.~....;;_;;_.:;..;:;.;...;._...;....;;..._ comes into mind. You will very rarely find a tug, workboat, or any soap. 
to 
not carry some of this stuff for their handy little spills if something goes wrong. 
to report spills, accidents, or anything that may reflect on the license, 
holding abilities of the people involved in it. And the oil companies are not very 
you have such massive publicity made about incidents. Understandings can 
when paychecks tend to pull the strings. 
and tank cleaning. Fifty miles offshore everybody opens up their bilge systems 
junk over the side. Also tank cleaning is being conducted regularly outside 
zone. What this has the effect of doing is creating certain locals of offshore sewers, 
opens up their bilges there and everybody closes down their pumping there. So the 
to as much out before you get into the exclusion zone; and as soon as you clear the 
pump it all over the side and clean it out. I have actually been on ships 
to this, there are certain regulations that you can only pump out so much per such 
been on ships that have actually gone out and spun doughnuts in the ocean, 
to comply. This is not altogether uncommon. 
I there is a tremendous need for Santa Barbara to 
open water roadsteads anywhere, and certainly the best on 
out there. A roadstead is basically an open area of fairly calm water where 
so forth, are quite accessible. There is a definite possiblity that once they have their 
that the marine terminals will open up this area as a port, and for the good of the 
perhaps that is necessary. However, no one has looked at this, at the benefits of 
authority such as Port Hueneme and Port San Luis have both done. It gives you 
Perhaps Mr. Sollen1s committee could be organized under a port 
to gain revenues from the moving of cargo over your docks. It gives you an 
reason to butt your nose beyond the limits of the shore, if this is your port. 
of tankers is primarily a reflection of the ports into which they can get. 
a certain draft. Some of them, particularly in San Francisco Bay, have to lighten 
inside San Francisco Bay, and then move off to pump off at the refinery. With an 
as you have in Santa Barbara, there is a possibility that instead of scaling the 
size of the port, the tankers could move up to a much larger scale, which could 
in a roadstead. 
a lot of expert testimony about how things are supposed to be. Well, I have 
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work8d among the laborers, and I arn here to tell you thai it is quite a bit different. dri 
mostly, become rituals. drills have a similar nature. do not real 
ways we would really deal with a particular emergency. we 
about it than the people I have working under me on They are down with 
that someone has made up for them, and !hey look at and 
is a need for the training of inspectors to increase their ability to independently go out t 
rogul8te. I do think there is a tremendous need for inspectors. 
Inert gas systems. An inert gas system is great if it's and it also it 
get breached. If you have a collision, even a small boat colliding with a tanker, you hawl 
breacherl your inert gas system, anrl you are back to an explosive I have never ,net 
vapor recovery system. If you do not have such a syst ern, and Pori San Luis 
example, you can get vapors running along the water line, and pleasure boats can te 
I would suggest that inspectors, and those in charge of enforcing regulations, be 
higher standarrl, and that the oil industry does not supervise itself or pay those who 
There is a great need for a Port Authority in this area to give a continuous and 
regulatory control. 
them. 
SD.,.JA TOR MARKS: I am among things the Chairman of Committee on \-1aritime 
Industry. It is a pleasure to hear from you. I think we should hear from more who are the 
maritime indus! ry as to the problems of the maritime inrlust ry, and I mn very qiad 1 tHI you 
here. LJne of the problems of the maritime industry is that not all the ships are built the :Jnited 
CHAIRMAN Our next and las! public witness is Geoff Chung, Ph.D., who is concerned 
wit the interactions with offshore oil and gas development. 
GEOFFREY CHUNG: My name is Geoff and I am the interim manrHJer 
ironrnental 1-lealth and Safety Office. I would like to offer some 
er in 
Because of the Universi proximity and unique proximity to form Hol 
expansion of the offshore oil and gas operations along our coastline, we have a campus 
and sensitive environ;nents thai could be exposed lo deleterious effecls arising fron1: 
1. A major oil spill arising from a plat form weti blowout, or tanker transi 
operation. 
2. A tanker or platform fire or explosion. 
3. A sudden or accidental release or venting of gases into the 
at nuisance levels. 
have surmised from today's hearing that coordination and mobilization for a reasonab 
timely notification and response to any of these scenarios are quite limited at this time. 
:1bout 
like to see assurances, either from legislative action or administrative action and enforcement the!! 
we will have guaranteed support and assistance from the private oil sector, Federr~l, loc::d, 
agencies. There should be a local comprehensive and function<1l plrm that wil 
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response for the campus to minimize destruction of our 
damage and setbacks to a lot of vital academic marine research 
any hazardous exposures to our campus populations. 
in the process of drafting a contingency plan to address air quality 
difficult at this writing to complete the interface portions of our 
and private sectors because many of them have not 
portions. 
to see a more active role in motivating proper coordinated contingency planning. 
HART: Thank you very much. I would like to make some concluding remarks if I 
I like to thank my colleagues, Senator Marks and Senator McCorquodale, 
us throughout this lengthy hearing today. Also, I want to mention that if anyone 
comments to be sure to leave them with either of our two repositories over here. 
Let me just mention a few of the impressions that I have. It strikes me that one of the most 
is the issue of jurisdiction. Repeatedly today, we have heard of concerns 
and I think that is an area on which this Subcommittee needs to spend some 
There have been a number of suggestions in the area. It is particularly troublesome 
as it to national or international bodies because we obviously have limited or no jurisdiction as 
it In any case, I think any solution has to address to what extent we can become 
national or international bodies or regulatory authorities. I do not think it is an 
I do think it is a very challenging one. 
also heard concerns about enforcement. As our last witness, as well as other 
am not sure 
go about more effectively enforcing? That may be the $64,000 question. I 
answer is, but I think some better understanding of what is being implemented, 
of our 
extent are conditions that are being imposed, or the regulations of laws being enforced is 
Subcommittee needs to know more about. 
A number of people made references to cutbacks in the Coast Guard, a 
affiliated with the University made strong pleas for research funds. 
are legitimate concerns and of interest to the Subcommittee. 
areas that I was interested in that I think are deserving of additional attention are 
to sea particularly in the western end of the Channel and around the 
Conception area, and also the issue of fire prevention. It seems to me that the fire prevention 
A 
is really inadequate. I am not sure what the answer is, but it is something that is of 
concern to me. 
area I think is deserving of some attention by the Subcomittee is the issue of what 
Puerto Rican. Trying to understand that accident that occurred a year ago may 
give us some greater insights into what steps we can take here locally in terms of contingency 
would strengthen whatever role we are going to be involved in in terms of trying to 
to 
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These are some of the comments and concerns that I have. This is 
his Subcommittee; there will be others, and I think that this forum 
forward on soe potential legislation. 
Let me again thank particularly Mr. Schuyler and the 
the people associated with the Unviersity of California for helping put on this 
the first 
tanks to all the participants and everyone who came forward, some 
distances, and many people with very busy schedules to participate in 
was a lhought ful hearing, and I am very pleased that everyone was able to 
not any further comments, this meeting will stand adjourned. 
--ooOoo--
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In 1970 the tanker Polycommander ran aground on the Spanish 
coast and spilled 112,000 barrels. The spill caught 
a fire storm, and sent a black mist of oil and 
soot over coastal farms. 
In 1983 the Castillo De Belver broke up and burned off 
South Africa, resulting in-great damage to hundreds of square 
s rich coastal farmland. 
In 1984 the Puerto Rican blew up as it left San Francisco 
and sunken half of it is still leaking oil. Earlier that 
the Sealift Pacific almost went aground off Monterey. No 
could have reached it in time, but fortunately its anchors 
ld. 
On August 2 of this year the Jan ran into a lighthouse off 
Denmark and spilled 1,500 barrels of heavy oil doing consider-
able damage to resorts and wildlife. · 
All of these accidents have occurred over the years in some part 
of the world. What is the likelihood that similar accidents 
could occur in this region over the next 25 years? 
TECHNOLOGY 
classes of accidents that will be considered at 
hear are: 
f s and spills resulting from ship with ship collision 
s and spills resulting from ship with platform collision 
tug, barge collision with ship or fixed platform 
fire on board ship in transit 
f on board ship 
emergency cargo offloading operations 
ship s ing 
emergency towing operations 
stranding of ship, barge or tug with resulting cargo loss 
and associated pollution 
explosion of tanker with resulting fire or sinking 
drilling unit blowout 
well control problems 
stranding of ladened barges 
break in pipelines, either offshore or on land 
accidents at onshore processing and storage facilities 
and from vehicles transporting hazardous oil and gas 
byproducts. 
What technology is in place and proposed to prevent accidents 
and respond if accidents should occur? What is the best avail-
able technology? 
What training is needed? Where and how does it occur? 
spection and monitoring programs.are ongoing or pro-
Are they adequate? 
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EXAMPLES OFFSHORE OIL SPILL HAZARDS 
FREQUENCY(YEARS)bf 
ACCIDENTAL EVENTS SPill VOLUME (bbl) CONTACTING COASTLINE 
BLOWOUT 1,000 - 10,000 ONCE IN 4,100 (unlikely) 
10,000- 100,000 ONCE IN 5, 700 
100,000 OR MORE ONCE IN 11,000 (rare) 
SEPARATOR RUPTURE 120 ONCE IN 48,000 (rare) 
I PIG RECEIVER ( 10 min.) 140 ONCE IN 83,000 (rare) I.J' 
'-l 
I 
PLATFORM IRENE 2,500 ONCE IN 910,000 (rare) 
COLLAPSE 
OIL PIPELINE RUPTURE - 8,400 ONCE IN 16,000 (rare) 
MIDWAY TO SHORE 
INTERPLATFORM PIPELINE UP TO 1,250 ONCE IN 45,000 (rare) 
RUPTURE 
SPILL FROM MARINE TRAFFIC 
** 
THREE PERCENT OF ALL 
PRECAUTIONARY ZONE SPILLS ARE EXPECTED 
TO REACH LAND 
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ERIENCE 
IN 1981, 
EN PREVENT 
, IN THE 
CIDENTS 
BARBARA 
ED CALIFORNIA'S DAILY 0 
D THE RES E 
EN 
E OIL PRODUCT! 
HAS ONE OF THE HIGHEST PRODUCING RATES OF ANY PLATFORM, YET, A ER PRODUCING OVER 56 
MILLION BARRELS OF OIL, WE HAVE SPILLED ABOUT 5 BARRELS eF ~L. BY COMPARISON, THE 
AIU' B r1 l"ilt'1"tti'P ~ 
NATURAL SEEPS JUST OFFSHORE, NEAR THE UNIVERSITY,ADISCHARGE MORE THAN THAT EVERY~ 
1'/tfii/!L 
•t"'IR. HONDO IS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF HOW GOOD PLANNING AND DESIGN, COUPLED WITH 
CAREFUL OPERATIONS, CAN RESULT IN SAFE PRODUCTION OF THE OIL AND GAS THAT IS VITAL TO OUR 
ECONOMY, 
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POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ONSHORE SPILLS 
SPILL LOCATION SPILL SIZE (BBL) FREQUENCY (YEARS) 
ONSHORE OIL PIPELINES 100 OR MORE ONCE IN 170 (UNLIKELY) 
I I (lANDFALl TO lOMPOC) 1,000 OR MORE ONCE IN 1,700 (UNLIKELY) 0' ONCE IN 2,200 (UNLIK c 1 0.000 OR MORE I 
LOMPOC FACILITY 100 OR MORE ONCE IN 1,800 (UNLIKELY) 
1,000 OR MORE ONCE IN 2,800 (UNLIKELY) 
50,000 OR MORE ONCE IN 25.000 {RARE) 
ONSHORE OIL PIPELINES 100 OR MORE ONCE IN 56 (LIKELY) 
(LOMPOC TO ORCUTT) 900 OR MORE ONCE IN 560 (UNLIKELY) 
1.800 OR MOR,E ONCE IN 1,100 (UNLIKELY) 
ORCUTT FACILITY 100 OR MORE ONCE IN 1 00,000 (RARE) 
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IS CH WAS EP ED E EI IR E • I 
SHOWS E p E ES OF E ILLS WI E I E 
QUENCY. THE MO LIKELY SPILL OF 100 900 A PIP INE I 
ONCE IN 56 YEARS. LARGER PIPELINE SPILLS ARE SHOWN TO BE UNLIK RANGING ONCE IN 
107 YEARS TO 2,200 YEARS. THE POSSIBILITY OF A SPILL LARGER THAN 100 BBL OCCURRING AT THE 
PROCESSING FACILITIES RANGE FROM UNLIKELY TO RARE (ONCE IN 1,800 YEARS TO ONCE IN 100,000 
YEARS). 
I 
0\ 
N 
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YG #3A 
THE REGULATORY E IES REQU RE N ER OF MITIGATION MEASURES OFFSET THE NTIAL 
FOR ONSHORE I OF ALL 
0 THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY REQUIRES SPILL PREVENTION, CONTAINMENT AND 
0 
COUNTERMEASURE PLANS FOR ONSHORE FACILITIES. THESE PLANS SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE 
AS OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY ANS REQUIRED FOR OFFSHORE OPERATIONS BY THE MMS. 
IN ADDITION TO MEETING THE FEDERAL AND STATE STANDARDS FOR CONSTRUCTION AND I 
OF PIPELINES, SANTA BARBARA COUNTY HAS ADDED SEVERAL REQUIREMENTS: (1) A SYSTEM 
SAFETY REVIEW OF ALL OIL DEVELOPMENTS TO ENSURE 'THE BEST POSSIBLE DESIGN OF FACILI-
TIES, (2) THE ADDITION OF ONSHORE ISOLATION VALVES AT STRATEGIC LOCATIONS ON PIPELI 
ROUTES, (3) CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR ILLS FROM ONSHORE PIP INES, (4) DELUGE SYSTEMS 
TO CONTROL FIRES AT CERTAIN TYPES OF STORAGE TANKS AND TRUCK LOADING, (5) SPECI IZ 
EMPLOYEE TRAINING PROGRAMS AND OTHER PROJECT-SPECIFIC AND SITE-SPECIFIC CONDIT! 
ADDRESS THE POTENTIAL ACCIDENT SITUATIONS ORIGINATING FROM ONSHORE PIPELINES 
FACILITIES. 
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TRAINING PROGRAMS 
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THE OTHER MAJOR CONCERN REGARD! NTIAL ACCIDENTS IS ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSPORTATION. 
WITH REGARD TO OFFSHORE TRAN ION RISKS AND MITIGATION MEASURES, I'LL NOW ADDRESS 
SHIPPING. THE RISKS ASSOCI WITH OFFSHORE PIPELINES HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED. YOU 
MAY RECALL THAT THE RISK OF A PIPELINE RUPTURE MIDWAY TO SHORE FROM THE UNION/EXXON 
DEVELOPMENT IN SANTA MARIA BASIN HAS BEEN CLASSIFIED AS RARE, OR ONCE IN 16,000 YEARS. 
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TANKER TRANSPORT ION. THE F E ENCY OF THE FIRST F R EVENTS, SHI 
s 
COLLISION, SHIP -LOADING FACILITY, TANKER ACCIDENT ILE UNDERWAY, I NT 
WHILE LOADING, RANGE FROM RARE (EVENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED ON A WORLD BASIS, ONLY A FEW 
TIMES) TO UNLIKELY TO OCCUR DURING THE LIFE OF THE PROJECT. THE ONLY LIK Y SPI WOULD 
BE ONE OF UP TO A MAXIMUM OF 500 BBL CAUSED BY A TANKER LOADING FAILURE. 
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POTENTIAL SPILLS CAUSED BY TANKER TRANSPORTATION 
EVENTS 
SHIP-TO-PLATFORM COLLISION 
SHIP-TO-LOADING FACILITY 
TANKER ACCIDENT WHILE UNDERWAY 
TANKER ACCIDENT WHILE LOADING 
AND LOADING FAILURE 
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SPILL SIZE 
(Barrels) 
-
500,000 
15,000 
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30,000 
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30,000 
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FROM 1 5 1983. HIS T LE, IC I BASED ON OFFICI 
TRANSPORTATION STATI ICS, SHOWS E L GEST CRUDE OIL SPI 
TANKER WAS AN 833 BARREL EVENT IN 1980. IN CONTRAST, THE LARGE 
DOMESTIC ONSHORE PIPELINE WAS A 110,000 BARREL EVENT IN 1983. 
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197 1 5,000 
1976 191 9,271 
1977 10,500 
I 1978 1 7 10,000 
1979 25,200 
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NUMB R F CRUD 01 SPILLS PER BILLION ON/MILES 
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morn I am d H. Anderson, President of 
i more often as GOO. I appreciate this 
ar fore today, and want to thank 
s hear ta Barbara. 
citizens action group of approximately 1,000 
s was f at time of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil 
spil has terruption) monitored offshore oil 
area 
t a nearly 17 years. 
I icy has to seek protection of our air quality, strict 
oil llution li ility lations, the utilization of the 
st il le 1 at all times, and to ensure that 
0 1 s area is ac ished wi minimal 
tnesses have testified before me have 
annel and the Santa Maria Basin 
are iterally elmed with a flood of oil - oil to 
ssed transported in this area. Faced as 
we are an se f almost 1,000 % in oil production, 
ra is on its way to becoming one of the major 
oil centers of contiental ited States. This is something 
most of us have never wanted, and something which at best is 
to iffi t to live with. 
of GOO's atest concerns has been that offshore 
0 1 1 d sa ly. We are the first to admit that the 
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eum 
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11 ee at a la , catast ic 
ar r a only 7 1 1 
S from blowouts 2, ,0 
er 
rels 
ration waters oil t 
total amount of oil spill 
riod. 
st fi s icate a ot 1 
.S. waters during 1981, a s ilar 
ill to 53.6% of the total 
1 ri U.S. waters. 
spilled another of total 
at sties one easily comes to the con 
1 
reat locally comes 
platforms themselves. 
tween a tanker loaded 
an oil platform and/or a 
il ter than 1969 
cur as denced by records showing 
ramm s f il plat in the Gulf of Mexico from 1971 
A t A. H. ler of UCSB in 1918 for 
tor Har st total cost of such an accident as 
scr 
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at $636 million of whi $350 million would be cle costs 
ta and other expenses that would 
Barbara region. 
to 
Again, 
probabili of s 
0.47 per thousand, 
over the next 20 
year._ 
to Mr. ler, the statistical 
an accident occurring in the 1 are 
85.6 acci ts occurring in the channel 
i at rate f 4. 8 colli ions r 
Although at this date shipment most is ion's 
oil seems to be assured pipeline, and tanker traffic may very 
well never reach 
you will 
able risks 
GOO 
li il ty laws 
!eve s s 
i area 11 be 
acci ts 
more str 
Mr. ler, I thi 
i absolutely unaccept-
er of oil llution. 
oi sp 11 and oil pollution 
state eral 
rnment. datE 1 islation s state 
limits eas liabili 
imposed are 
described by 
Barbara oil 
r 
ill 
in 1984 liars) s 
laws now in ef t. 
limits. However, realistically 
te. A 
ler, or even a 
would 
y would not 
accident such as that 
tition of 
cost more an $ 
Santa 
mill ion 
any li ili 
A no area of concern s e il ty of oil 
lieve it is 1 spill conta i We 
past time for t ustry to t that sent oil 
spill equi t is 1 ly tive. Ri t now maximum 
amount of an oil il occurr water t has 
a conf 
1 
1 
are 
a 
9 
not 
2 i not tainment of spills in 
ter 
s as a is another matter ' if 
ca recovery rate is 
dramat c 
sent cle 
s were made shortly after 
s equipment are still 
ffective 
an 20 
waves are greater than six feet, winds 
currents eater l to 2 
itions s lar to the above exist in channel 
of the time, particularly in the Point 
area where much oil development is now under way. 
e 
ts 
lieve the lifornia Coastal Commission has erred 
ir the oil industry to meet more stringent clean-
conta t at s. The commission has long ad-
y of exist equipment and its failure 
irements of the California Coastal Act. 
once again urges the state, and the federal 
t, to give oil industry this message - improve 
containment technology or quit offshore 
are convinced the industry will meet whatever 
ill cl 
tion. 
s are 
To 
1 we 
on s 
ri 
e state 
raffi 
at s 
of a shipping catastrophe in the 
the federal government to fund a 
s in channel. Havi 
many years, and without success, 
we well know difficult it will be to effect any changes 
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shipping regulations. 
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fur Ba ste f 
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we are 
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i r from nci from 
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not i to handle an oil ill 
ite of e assistance ided Clean as 
lean s L 
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ff 
t s 
matter. 
as we 
te y 
f oil. It s 
acr f 
oil s 1 t. ti 
leading role he has t en in 
tried to point out, there remains 
rds to be put in place, if we are 
s fac us with this massive 
tant that Santa Barbara is not 
ss. 
i lege of sent is 
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ar 
ies coul~ n 't cope with San Francisco ~ ill 
! LJ~.l::·: T 
··on 
the 
ICF. 
Coast 
Uffice, •.gned 
Coordinator's 
the report make dear 
not only was the bes! 
seriously inadeqaa!e for effec-
recovery and containment of this off-
shore spill, but that frequent 
the operation throughout. 
None of the three 
California has any offshore 
capabilities. Of the four vessels 
called by the Coast Guard, three 
of commission within four hours. 
Francisco fireboat was not able to 
of nort because mechanical 
problems and 
the An 
outside 
owner's cooperat 
potential interest salvage 
to con!lict with goal of 
nrPv,.nlimJ. The only recourse 
be the Intervention on the 
Seas Act, which requires from 
-the Coast Guard commandant on a case-by-
case basis. The authority to prevent the 
Puerto Rican's owner from her 
closer to shore was not obtained 40 
hours after the explosion. 
After the tugboat secured a line to 
the Puerto Rican, the best location for the 
vessel was determined 12 miles below 
the Farallon Islands 
Pt. Montara. This ~~~'"'~" 
the mission 
tion, with particular concern 
productive Farallon Islands 
tuary. As such, National 
fuel 
For the past nine has 
to leak an estimated 20 a day 
hear! of bouomfish and 
do for 
!he main tho 
Farallc"1~ S'Jrroun~ed oil. 
the night, the spill had drifted - unnoticed 
25 miles north. 
National Fish e:r man Vol 66, !Vo 6 (08fcber 
the Oil 
Tracking the oil, according to the report, 
proved to be a major 
night and in the when 
overflights was curtailed. For the entire 
of the Puerto Rican not 
one of the multitude of experts involved 
though! throw a radio in-
the oil slick, this 
function in 
very seas currents of less than 
l !12 knots. The is the Mr. Clean II. 
Buill in 1978 and a capability of 
sea the 130' Mr. Clean II is the star of 
the companies' oil-spill fleet. In the on-
scene report, the Mr. Clean II is described 
as a slate-of-the-lUI vessel for handling off-
shore oil spills. in the firs! 
the majo~ ·;-'!!, :h~ '~-. 
Clean was able to clean up oil in the 
open sea for fewer than 15 hours. 
.· 
for one there was 
The hoat curtailed all work due 
in fog, and the entire · 
that the oil slick worked its way ' 
the coast and harbors along 
way, the Mr. Clean ll was rendered 
useless on the open ocean as soon as seas hit 
5' ' 
The Coast Guard report concludes, 
encountered weather condi-
tions greatly reduce the effectiveness of all 
available offshore cleanup equipment .. , 
Though an offshore containment and re-
9overy capability is present, it is of limited 
effectiveness in a major offshore spill." 
Furthermore, the Mr. Clean II spent the 
first three days after the spill laid up in Half 
Moon Bay for repairs, While the boat was 
responding to the call in 10' to 12' seas on 
the night of the break-up, a wave knocked 
out the windows of the pilothouse, which 
sits atop a 23'-high superstructure. The 
wave also knocked out the captain and 
most of his electronics. 
Clean Bay (the oil .company co-op that 
runs the Mr. Clean II) claims in its sum-
of actil(ities included in the Coast 
report that the Mr. Clean II hit a 
. ..Jl:.ea1c_wave two miles offshore. However, 
further investigation reveals that it is much 
more likely that a serious error in naviga-
was made while the boat was 
harbor. 
report filed by the Half Moon Bay har-
master's office describes an incident 
occurred between the No. I and No. 3 
just outside the jetty. Bob McMann, 
the harbor master, oversaw the efforts to 
the criooied boat back to port that 
"they got 
on the wrong side of the 
put them on the reef. This put 
-them in the breakers, 
that reef forever and are quite 
thing from a freak wave. 
"The' reason we took so much trouble to 
determine their position was because 
captain was unconscious and the first mate 
incapacitated, and we [a harbor 
was also ihe 
off the reef back 
... I felt for the guys, because 
they came within yards of 
also about that tanker out 
there all over and 
were the guys who to 
out there handling it." [] 
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SUMMARY 
CAN exploded st into 
e and then drifted to th a 
weather conditions permitted 
to the Bay to respond and to bring 
two of them suffered mechani 
to return to the bay. 
undertow in the waters of Point 
Marine Sanctuary {contrary to 
CAN broke in two and the stern 
5,000 barrels (1,050,000-1,470,000 
ocean, creating a major pollution 
d applicat~on was delayed because a 
was unava e: the principal industry boat had 
by high seas. , 
moved south the f 
, as predicted by the NOAA spill trajectory 
d not touch land, suddenly, on the third niqfit, the 
ion and moved north, first encircling the 
ashore in Bodega Bay and Bodega 
it damaged equipment greatly reduced 
iveness at sea, and lack of barges limited 
of oil 
gallons) of 
Bodega 
s Approximately 1,500 barrels 
oil were skimmed from the ocean 
entire 
when the 
ident, representing less 
ip broke up. Estimates of total rel 
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of the total bird mortalities resulti from inci have 
been placed as high as 5,000. 
Eighteen days after the explosion, the bow section of the 
RICAN was towed back into San Francisco Bay without incident and the 
cargo safely unloaded. Although the stern section has been located 
in 1,246 feet of water through the use of side-scan sonar, no action 
has been taken to the leak which has continued since the sink-
ing. It was estimated that the stern contained 8,500 barrels (367,000 
gallons) of bunker fuel when it sank, but the results of our investi-
gation strongly suggest that an additional 11,725 barrels (492,000 
gallons) of oil cargo may also have gone down with the ship. 
In this report we focus on specific responses to the PUERTO 
RICAN incident as a test of Northern California's spill response 
capability. We identify a number of problems encountered in 
dealing with the explosion, fire, spill and sinking of the vessel. We 
then care examine these difficulties to determine why they occur 
and make a series of recommendations designed to eliminate the 
problems, thus improving responses to future pollution in~ents. 
1. Offshore fire fighting capability does not ·exist in the 
Bay Area, and only the moderate weather conditions at the time of 
the explosion and fire made it possible to use fireboats that nor-
mally are restri to the Bay. In more severe weather, the 
fire likely would have continued until the entire ship sank. 
This problem can only be solved with a vessel with offshore 
capability based in the Bay Area and available for fire fighting 
{and perhaps towing, spill cleanup and oil storage) in waters off 
of Central and Northern california. 
2. Emergency offshore towing this region is provided only 
vessels of opportunity. The PUERTO RICAN nearly drifted ashore 
before a tug that simply happened to be in the area was able to tow 
it offshore. 
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RI 
A • dedicated vessel designed for offshore 
be based Bay Area and available for 
no an regarding a location to which the PUERTO 
to imize danger to the environment. 
A plan should be developed to identify offshore areas to 
damaged or distressed vessels can be towed in order to reduce 
risks environmental damage. 
4. Predictions of the oil spill movement failed to anticipate 
current reversal. Lack of previous oceanographic research 
on currents and real-time information on spill location at 
ni ctive effectiveness. 
A research program is needed to develop a better understand-
ing circulation patterns in the Gulf of the Farallones and the rest 
of central and northern california. Telemetry drifter buoys should be 
utilized to track spill movement under poor visibility conditions. 
5. Offshore cleanup capability was seriously limited by weather 
and pment availability. Much valuable time was lost in bringing 
in equipment from out of the region. Difficulties were encountered 
wi chartered equipment refusing to respond in bad weather or being 
too from site of the spill. 
industry should be required to base its own offshore 
vessel and barges in the Bay Area for quick response and should 
develop plans for the staging of booms and other materials in areas 
of high risk (e.g., harbor and river mouths, biologically sensitive 
areas, etc.). 
1 1on to apply oil dispersants was made in the ab-
sence of complete information regarding potential damage to the en-
vironment from oil or toxicity of the dispersed oil. 
The state should develop a program to deterwdne the acute 
and chronic toxicity of dispersants and dispersed oil, create a 
library of information on dispersant effectiveness and toxicity, 
and develop guidelines regulating conditions for dispersant appli-
monitoring • 
. 7. sunken stern continues to leak bunker fuel oil into 
waters of the marine sanctuary and nearly half a million gallons of 
additional oil product may also be in the stern. 
The Coast Guard and/or the ship owner should be required 
to for• a survey of the stern, attempt to stop the leak(s) 
and make recommendations regarding the remaining oil product on 
board. 
8. Information on resources (organisms and habitats) at risk 
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' . . 
in the area was incomplete, resulting in 
regarding protection strategies. 
ion making 
A detailed catalog and maps of resources, their 
seasonality and sensitivity to should be developed for 
NOrthern and Central california, and computerized for ease 
periodic revision (with the assistance of local resource 
experts). 
9. The direction of the movements of the PUERTO RICAN by the 
On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) required the presence of a 
representative of the OSC at all times during the incident. At 
one of the most critical periods of incident, the OSC 
representative was forced by weather conditions to leave the 
scene and this is when the tug violated the Coast Guard 
boundaries and the PUERTO RICAN sank. 
In order to maintain total control of a pollution incident 
and vessels involved in it, the On-Scene Coordinator must have a 
representative present at all times. It should be possible to 
develop a systea for delegation of several representatives, or to 
have a designated representative appoint a replacement if he must 
leave the scene. 
10. The tug towing the PUERTO RICAN crossed boundaries 
establishing prohibited areas and spent almost half a day in 
violation of Coast Guard orders, north and east of bounded areas. 
There appear to have been no written es of the orders 
establishing these boundaries. 
Procedures should be established to require that explicit 
orders relating to Coast Guard intervention authority be in 
writing and that copies of such orders be delivered to vessel 
owners or their representatives and other interested parties. 
The PUERTO RICAN explosion, fire, breakup and sinkin~-were all 
components of a serious pollution incident. However, the small number 
of birds and mammals present in the Gulf of the Farallones during this 
time of year minimized the environmental damage. Had this incident oc-
curred several months earlier, the ial damage to sea birds might 
well have been severe, with perhaps an order of magnitude more birds on 
S.E. Farallon Island: and if it been a few months later, tens of 
thousands of whales, elephant seals and Steller sea lions would have 
been in the area. This, combined with the relatively light oil pro-
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lled that did not persist on beaches and rocky, intertidal 
areas, contributed great to a much milder incident than might 
occurred a more typical crude oil product. 
Despite the fact that the PUERTO RICAN incident was not a "worst 
case" accident, the resulting damage and insurance claims may 
well exceed $150 million. 
The Coast Guard has already begun to revise its Oil Spill Contin-
gency Plan, consistent with some of the recommendations made in this 
report, and legislation has recently been enacted in the state which 
will improve resource mapping and dispersant effectiveness research. 
We hope that the recommendations presented here will be used to 
further improve future responses to oil spills off the Central and 
Northern California coast. 
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SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT- NOV. 4, 1985 HEARING ~ 
I HAVE COME TO FACTUALLY ABOUT CAPABILITY ON THE 
CENTRAL COAST FOR THE CONTAINMENT AND CLEANUP OF MARINE OIL SPILLS 
I HAVE SOME FAMILIARITY WITH THAT SUBJECT BECAUSE I AM 
MANAGER OF CLEAN SEAS, AN ORGANIZATION CREATED 15 YEARS AGO BY THE 
OIL INDUSTRY TO PROVIDE JUST SUCH A CAPABILITY. 
JUST A FEW WORDS OF BACKGROUND. 
CLEAN SEAS CAME INTO BEING SHORTLY AFTER THE 1969 OIL SPILL 
IN THE SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL -- WHICH HAD MADE IT ALL TOO APPARENT THAT --
.,J 
AT THAT TIME -- THERE WAS REALLY NO EFH:CTIVE WAY TO DEAL WITH LARGE 
OIL SPILLS IN THE OPEN OCEAN. 
THE OIL INDUSTRY -- PARTICULARLY THOSE COMPANIES OPERATING IN 
THE CHANNEL -- IMMEDIATELY REALIZED THAT THERE NEEDED TO BE THE 
CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH POTENTIAL OFFSHORE OIL SPILL EMERGENCIES. 
THE LIKELIHOOD OF SIGNIFICANT OIL SPILL EMERGENCY, 
TO DAY IS EXTREMELY REMOTE -- EVEN MORE SO IN VIEW OF INCREASINGLY MORE 
STRINGENT OPERATING RULES AND CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED TECHNIQUES 
AND TECHNOLOGY" 
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IOUSLY NO OUTSIDE CONTRACTOR COULD AFFORD TO INVEST THE MILLIONS 
AND ~1ILLIONS OF DOLLARS REQUIRED TO DEVELOP AND t1AINTAIN A CLEANUP 
CAPABILITY THAT WOULD SELDOM, AND POSSIBLY NEVER, BE USED. FOR SUCH A 
CAPABILITY TO BE AVAILABLE, THE OIL INDUSTRY WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE IT. 
CLEAN SEAS CAME INTO BEING. WE PRESENTLY HAVE 16 MEMBER OIL COMPANIES 
WHO CONTRIBUTE 4-5 MILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR. IN A MOMENT WE WILL LOOK AT 
WHAT CLEAN SEAS HAS BECOME -- 15 YEARS LATER. 
BUT, FIRST, ANOTHER BIT OF BACKGROUND: 
THE OIL INDUSTRY WAS CORRECT. OIL SPILL CONTAINMENT AND CLEANUP 
QUICKLY BECAME AN IMPORlANT ELEMENT IN THE FEDERAL APPROVAL PROCESS. 
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (WHICH EXERCISES JURISDICTION 
AND CONTROL OVER DEVELOPMENT IN FEDERAL WATERS THROUGH THE MINERALS 
MANAGEMENT SERVICE) AND THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (WHICH HAS ULTIMATE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THAT OFFSHORE OIL SPILLS ARE CLEANED UP) DEVELOPED 
A OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF ACTIVITIES AND 
FACILITIES ON THE U.S. OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF. 
AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE MOU GIVES THE COAST GUARD THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO REVIEW OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY PLANS SUBMITTED TO MMS BY 
PROSPECTIVE OFFSHORE OIL OPERATORS. THE CRITERIA TO JUDGE THE ADEQUACY 
OF OIL SPILL RESPONSE ORGANIZATION. CLEANUP EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES 
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ARE JOINTLY SET BY MMS AND THE COAST 
ESSENTIALLY, I 
JUST 
THE VERY BEST THERE IS! 
THE MOU ALSO ESTABLI A ICAL 
OF MMS AND COAST GUARD EXPERTS I GUARD N ING 
THE CONTINGENCY PLANS SUBMITTED. IFI 
1. ADVISE WHETHER RESPONSE IPMENT ACTUALLY MEETS 
CURRENTLY CRI IA; 
2. ADVI AND 
ARE ADr:QUATE; 
3. ADVI ING PONSE TIME LOCAL 
I 
4. KEEP OF NEW IN EQUI 
SO AS ISE ACCORD Y; AND, 
5. PROVIDE ICAL I Pf•1ENT 
BY THE I 
IN SHORT, THE I I s IS: 
E CAPABILI TO CONTAIN AND CLEANUP OIL SPILLS MAINTAINED BY 
li IS AND UNDER ROUTINE SURVEI 
BY PROFESSIONALS -- PROFESSIONALS TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED IN THIS 
S ECIFIC AREA OF EXPERTISE. THEY HAVE ONLY ONE STANDARD OF ACCEPTANCE -
E BEST! 
WI THAT AS A BACKGROUND, LET'S LOOK AT THE OIL SPILL 
CONTAINMENT AND CLEANUP SITUATION TODAY ON THE CENTRAL COAST. 
CLEAN SEAS' AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY REACHES FROM POINT MUGU ON THE 
SOUTH, AND NORTH JUST ABOVE MORRO BAY. 
BY w~s COAST GUARD REGULATION, UlL SPILL PROTECTION 
THE SOURCE. EACH PLATFORM, DRILL IP AND TAN R 
IN I RESPONSE EQUIPME N INED 
PLOY IT QUIC THE SMALL SPILLS THEY ARE DESIGNED TO HANDLE, 
A FEW GALLONS OR A FEW BARRE ARE RARE. BUT THE OPERATORS AND 
I N y. 
IF THE I I IS QUICKLY HANDLED ON THE SPOT, CLEAN 
SE WOULD BE L 
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WE DO NOT HAVE THE TIME LIST AND DESCRIBE THE P11ENT C SEAS 
HAS ON HAND FOR RESPONSE SPILLS, BUT SOt1E EXAMPLES WOULD BE INFORr1ATIVE. 
HERE ARE A FEW SLIDES TO SHOW THIS. 
THE MAINSTAYS OF CLEAN SEAS' OFFSHORE I IALLY 
DESIGNED OIL SPILL RECOVERY VESSELS -- MR CLEAN-I and -II (CLEAN 
SEAS IS ADDING MR CLEAN-111,180' VESSEL COMPLETELY EQUIPPED AS MR CLEAN-I 
AND MR CLEAN-II ARE, ALONG WITH A 45' FAST RESPONSE BOOM BOAT TO REINFORCE 
OUR CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO AN INCIDENT IN THE SANTA MARIA BASIN. THIS 
VESSEL WILL BE KEPT IN THE NITY OF . ARGUELLO.) MR CLEAN-I IS 
MOORED IN SANTA BARBARA. 
A SPEED OF 12 KNOTS, PLUS LARGE FUEL AND WATER CAPACITY, 
THE SHIP TO A ILL SITE QUICKLY AND REMAIN AT SEA 
PERIODS TIME. IT CARRIES ADVANCING SKIMMERS ON EITHER SIDE 
AND IS CAPABLE OF CLEANING A 124-FOOT SWATH. THROUGH AN OIL ICK ON EACH 
THAT RECOVERY EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF OPERATING IN EIGHT- TO 
TEN-FOOT SEAS AND WINDS OF 20 KNOTS, WITH DEPLOYMENT ACCOMPLISHED IN 
THE FIVE- TO SIX-FOOT RANGE. THE COAST GUARD RECOGNIZES MR CLEAN-I 
AS STATE OF THE ART. 
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MR CLEAN-II, MOORED AT SAN LUIS BAY, IS SIMILAR TO MR CLEAN-I. 
R TIMEFRAME BETWEEN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TWO SHIPS, AN 
SKIMMER, OFFSHORE DEVICE, WAS DEVELOPED AND TESTED. UNDER MANY 
CONDITIONS, IT PROVED TO BE SUPERIOR TO EXISTING EQUIPMENT AND WAS, 
THEREFORE, SELECTED FOR THE NEW VESSEL. SEVERAL YEARS OF AT-SEA EXPERI E 
AND TESTING CONFIRMED ITS VALUE . THEREFORE, IN KEEPING WITH ITS 
RESPONSIBILITY, CLEAN SEAS REPLACED THE ORIGINAL SKIMMERS ON MR CLEAN-I WI 
OFFSHORE DEVICES. 
RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF CONTAINMENT BOOMS AT THE SPILL SITE IS, 
OF COURSE, THE EFFECTIVE WAY TO MINIMIZE POTENTIAL DAMAGE. TO 
ACCOMPLISH THIS, CLEAN SEAS HAS TWO SPECIALLY DESIGNED 
SPEED. THIS RESPONSE TIME IS, IN MOST CASES, MANY TI11ES FASTER THAN 
SPECIFIED IN COAST GUARD GUIDELINES. 
IN ADDITION TO THE SKIMMERS MOUNTED ON MR CLEAN-I AND 
MR CLEAN-II, CLEAN SEAS LISTS AN INVENTORY of 18 SKIMMERS OF VARIOUS 
ILITIES AND DESIGNED FOR USE UNDER A VARIETY OF CIRCUMSTANCES. 
THESE INCLUDE SELF-PROPELLED WEIR-TYPE UNITS INTENDED FOR HARBORS AND 
PROTECTED WATERS;HYDRAULIC AND AIR-DRIVEN SKIMMERS, PRINCIPALLY USED 
TO RECOVER OIL HELD BEHIND CONTAINMENT BOOMS; AND A CATAMARAN 
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PAGE 7 
SKIMMING BARGE, TOWED WITH OIL c A 
SWATCH THROUGH ING IL UNDER TI 
CLEAN SEAS' INVENTORY OF CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT TOTALS MORE THAN 
45,000 FEET OF VARIOUS SIZED BOOMS DESIGNED FOR SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS. THEY 
RANGE FROM MORE THAN MILES OF LIGHT BOOMS FOR HARBOR ION; OVER 
THREE MILES OF MEDIUM-HEAVY DUTY BOOM FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OFFSHORE AND 2~ 
MILES OF HEAVY-DUTY BOOM FOR CONTAINMENT IN MORE SEVERE SEA-STATES. 
BOOMS ARE ALSO DEPLOYED AS DIVERSION BARRIERS FOR THE PROTECTI 
SENSITIVE AREAS -- WETLANDS, SLOUGHS, R VER MOUTHS AND HARBORS. THESE 
SENSITIVE AREAS HAVE BE~N lUENTI~IED BY MA~INE BIOLOGI AND ILED PLANS 
HAVE BEEN I IVIOUALLY DEVELOPED FOR THE PROTECTION EACH AREA. 
GUARD GUIDELIN SPECIFY THAT EXERCISES FOR DEPLOYING 
EQUIPMENT IN OPEN SHOULD OCCUR AT ANNUALLY AND THAT THERE BE 
AT LEAST ONE HANDS- DRILL EACH AS PART OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM. INSTEAD 
ANNUALLY, CLEAN SEAS CONDUCTS SUCH DR AND EXERCISES AT LEAST TW C 
~10NTHL Y. THESE DRILLS TRAIN NEMBER y EL. THESE SESSIONS 
ARE FREQUENTLY OBSERVED AND MONI BY FEDERAL, AND LOCAL 
PERSONNEL, INCLUDING THE GUARD. ANY MEMBER OF YOUR STAFF IS INVI 
TO ATTEND THESE EXERCI 
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IN ADDITION TO TRAINING, THESE DRILLS AND EXERCISES ARE USEFUL IN 
NEW OR EXPERIMENTAL EQUIPMENT. 
THE COAST GUARD IS RESPONSIBLE FOR EVALUATING THE OIL INDUSTRY'S 
ABILITY TO CONTAIN AND CLEANUP OIL SPILLS IN THIS AREA. THEY EXAMINE 
TOTAL SYSTEM TO MAKE SURE THAT THERE IS SUFF~CIENT MIX IN 
EQUIPMENT TO MEET THE VARIETY OF POTENTIAL EMERGENCIES -- AND THAT EACH 
SIGNIFICANT COMPONENT IN THE MIX IS THE BEST AVAILABLE. 
EVALUATI IS A CONTINUOUS PROCESS. IT IS THFTR n~FICIAL 
DUTY AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO BE AWARE OF ADVANCES IN 
IQUE AND TECHNOLOGY -- AND THEN BE SURE THESE ADVANCES ARE 
ORPORATED INTO THE OIL INDUSTRY'S CONTAINMENT AND CLEANUP CAPABILI 
IN OFFICIAL REPORTS AND IN PUBLIC TESTIMONY, THE COAST GUARD GIVES 
CL SEAS HIGHEST MARKS FOR ITS PROVEN ABILITY TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY 
WI OCEAN EFFECTIVE EQUIPMENT. 
THE COAST GUARDS POSITIVE EVALUATION OF CLEAN SEAS' CAPABILITY 
I REINFORCED BY CONTINUOUS STUDIES CONDUCTED BY THE HIGHLY REGARDED 
CONSULTING FIRM OF WOODWARD-CLYDE. THEIR STAFF ARE SOME OF THE MOST 
EXPERIENCED.AND INFORMED OIL SPILL CLEANUP EXPERTS IN THE WORLD. 
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THEY FIRSTHAND, OBSERVED AND CRITIQUED CLEANUP RATI AT VIRTUA EVERY 
OIL SPILL OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE, WORLDWIDE, FOR MORE THAN A DECADE. THEY 
KNOW WHAT WORKS AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS. AND THEY FORTHRIGHTLY 
DESCRIBED CLEAN SEAS AS HAVING MORE OIL SPILL CONTAINMENT AND CLEANUP 
CAPABILITY THAN ANY SIMILAR ORGANIZATION -- ANYWHERE. THERE IS QUESTION, 
IN THEIR JUDGEMENT, OF CLEAN SEAS' ABILITY TO DEAL WITH OFFSHORE OIL SPILL 
EMERGENCIES. 
SO ..... THAT IS WHAT CLEAN SEAS IS TODAY-- AN EFFECTIVE, 
TRAINED AND PERIENCED ORGANIZATION CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH POTENTIAL 
OIL SPILL EMERGENCIES, PROMPTLY AND IVELY. IT IS OUR FURTHER 
RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN THIS STATUS IN E 
I'LL CLOSE WITH A FEW OBSERVATIONS ABOUT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
IN OIL SPILL CLEANUP. MOST OF US IN THIS FIELD FEEL THAT WE HAVE, PERHAPS, 
VIRTUALLY REACHED THE UPWARD LIMITS OF OUR ABILITY TO CLEANUP OIL MECHANICALLY. 
MOST OF THE RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTS NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY THE INDUSTRY, 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, AND BY OUTSIDE MANUFACTURERS ARE IN THE AREA OF 
DRAMATICALLY IMPROVING OUR CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH OIL SPILLS CHEMICALLY 
AND BIOLOGICALLY -- WITH NON-TOXIC DISPERSANTS AND ORGANISMS THAT WILL RENDER 
HYDROCARBONS HARMLESS TO THE MARl ENVIRONMENT. 
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AT THE PRESENT TIME, OF COURSE, CLEAN SEAS IS ABLE TO APPLY 
D SPE TO OIL SLICKS BY SURFACE VESSELS, HELICOPTERS, STATIONED 
OR BY A DC-4 THAT CAN BE ONSITE IN A FEW HOURS. THIS TYPE OF CHEMI 
APPLICATION IS AUTHORIZED BY REGULATORY AGENCIES NOW, ONLY WHEN OTHER 
COVERY METHODS ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE. BUT AS RESEARCH CONT 
AND POTENTIAL TOXICITY PROBLEMS ARE ELIMINATED, I PREDICT THAT MOST 
FUTURE ADVANCES WILL BE MADE IN THIS VERY PROMISING FIELD. 
BUT WHATEVER THE FUTURE HOLDS, THE OIL INDUSTRY AND CLEAN 
WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE MOST EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AGAINST OIL SPI 
E THAT SCIENCE AND PERSONAL DEDICATION CAN PROVIDE. 
K YOU. 
+ + + + + + + + + + 
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Statement 
Presented At 
Oil and 
A hearing under the 
Senate Subcommi 
on 
- 0 
ility (CAORF) 
Cali a State 
on and Background 
CAORF is to provide expert opinion and make 
the issue of reducing the major risks of offshore oil 
recovery operations. CAORF's area of expertise is in the appli 
design and analysis methods using shiphandling simul on. 
The Computer Aided Operations Research Facility (CAORF) is a 
government owned research facility under the direct management of 
Maritime Administration, Department of Transportation. CAORF is located 
on the grounds of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, 
York, and has been in operation since 1976. Most of CAORF 
are performed on a cost reimbursable basis. 
CAORF's pri research tool is high fidelity, 
man-i phandling simulation. Virtually any 
geographica 1 area and all the important variables that 
shiphandl collision avoidance and navigation can be simulated a 
very high degree accuracy and reallsm. 
method can be summarized as follows: We 
problems relating to the movement of ships and then permit practi 
ship's Captains, Pilots, or Mates (the men-in-the-loop) to sail 
mulated ship under a series of carefully designed, real is tic operati 
condit ons. Data are recorded and analyzed, and results reported 
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CAORF m i i 
worl not n raw si 
experience ion s 
world operational ems and needs. 
Of parti ar 
1980, the Cali 
on this on is in 
on was a 
od 1 
rea 
sponsor 
The Santa Barbara Risk Management Program was undertaken under the 
joint sponsorship the ifornia 
Admini ice 
resul 
Commiss on 
ions the 
the Maritime 
yiel 
of 
and permanent oil rigs and platforms relat to the ship traffic lanes 
Santa Barbara 
What are the or r1 associated w1 the rapid increase of 
oil and 
steps can be 
activities off the California coast? What 
reduce ? 
From the li to assi are associ 
wi increase in of navigating s 
to areas where offshore oil es are in 
include Increased ri ips wi 
other wi 
and in some an increase in the vessel ings. 
CAORF is parti patlng in this hearing because we believe 
phandling simulation provides the best and most reliable method 
assess these risks, and to assess the available risk reduction alternat 
that will come under consideraton. 
The advantage of man-in-the-loop simulation in risk assessment and i 
the evaluation of the effectivness of alternative approaches to 
reduction of risk is that this type of simulation considers all of 
elements comprising the marine transportation system. The system 
which vessels are navigated includes the characteristics of the 
environment, the channel or waterway geometry, aids to navigation, the 
vessel, the operator, and many other elements such as traffic conditions 
and schedule demands. Within this system, and in so far as 
navigation is concerned, the human operator is the executive or primary 
controller. 
Consequently, when simulation is used to assess the factors whi 
contribute or constrain safety, the man-machine systems perspective 
plays a major role in shaping how the problem is viewed. For exampl 
contributing to safety are any modifications to the system which result in 
more reliable and predictably accurate vessel positioning (e.g., the use 
precision electronic aids to navigation), or allows information to be more 
easily assimilated and accurate decisions more easily made (e.g., 
marking of fixed offshore structures with RACONS). 
Modifications that either constrain or contribute to safety can be 
any component of the system: the environment ( such as the placement of 
fixed structures in a traffic seperat ion zone); the information system 
available to the mariner (such as the prov1s1on of a VTS), or to the 
mariner himself (such as training programs). 
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The problem that the on 
to eval 
uat ion 
opinions about the rel ive 
changes are or, --or nove 1, even 
accurately assess their impacts. 
proposed on a 1 
inc! in the analysis. The operator, 
Since safety of system 1s a function 
w 
asses 
l of 
elements, and the operator is the executive of the entire system, 
ommision of any one el ally the can lead to incorrect 
eval 1ons. 
I de a 11y, on a s i world. uations should 
world is rarely a 
J-mission, man-i 
ising ternat 
e to conduct 
loop mulators become the most 
s of sk can and if A general 
ovr.~:n·,mental would be as follows: The miti 
design alternatives, whether be ishment of a VTS, 
modifi to gation, or ni are on 
ions that embody 
e increased traffic or fi 
ners that wi 1 actual lot 
then bring a ted vesse 1 through 
exi 
coll 
in a The 
P lots or 
it ons. the 
related 
is 
a 
alternatives can compared re 
In addition to providing a foundation for a sci if ri 
simulation has the added benefit of allowing experts 
proposed system design modifications in operation. This places 
in a much more informed position to base judgements as 
modifications on Indeed, a 
subjective observations the participating operational personnel i lt 
every experiment 
in 
the risk management 
mulation becomes a unique and val 
by performing the diff cult 
can 
of available alternatives througr1 mulation. 
can proceed to the evaluation of the various alternatives 
other factors such as ease of implementation, user acceptance and 
cost effect ivness. 
-107 
e 
Computer Aided Operations Research Facility 
National Maritime 
Kings Point, New 
"CAORF IN 60 SECONDS" 
The Computer Aided Operations Research Facility ( CAORF) contains 
the most sophisticated bridge simulator in the world today. Using 
the simulator, we are able to safely and economically model the 
marine world, expose ship officers to marine problems, and record 
performance as they act out their solutions to these problems. 
The heart of the facility is the simulated bridge containing real 
bridge equipment (such as radars, steering stand, communications 
equipment). The bridge is surrounded by a massive circular screen 
on which is projected a computer-generated image of the area in 
which the ship is sailing. A wide varie of ship models ranging 
from tankers to nuclear submarines can be used in simulation. 
i a behind CAORF is simple. We model problems involving 
shi ling then permit actual captains/pilots to sail the 
CAORF ship under realistic environmental conditions to observe the 
effects on human performance. Data are recorded and analyzed to 
permit objective decisions to be made concerning the adequacy of 
designs or the feasibility of different operating conditions. 
Proposed dredging designs can optimized (as in Norfolk), 
equipment requirements evaluated (as with Collision Avoidance 
Systems), shiphandling experience provided (as with u.s. Navy 
TRIDENT submarines) and training methodologies studied (as with 
maritime cadets and tugboat operators). 1 of this can 
accomplished from the safety of the simulator before des ns are 
implemented in the real world. 
90 .. 2 October 1985 
Statement before the Senate Subcommittee 
on Oil and Gas Development Hearing held on November, 1985 
at the University of California, Santa Barbara 
It seems inevitable that the subject of risk is raised in connection 
the ng development of oi 1 resources offshore the Santa Barbara ion. 
It is after all in the interest of each party that risks be minimized. 
their part, the oil industry can certainly be counted on to exert their very 
considerable engineering skills toward that end; the minimization of sk is a 
major responsibility of their engineering staffs and they possess considerable 
know-how in this business by now. The State of California and local communi-
es have no less interest in risk avoidance, as the fact of this Hearing 
attests. And, of course, Federal government agencies have specific responsi-
bilities for offshore risk avoidance. 
My own experience in the consideration and study of complex engineering 
questions is that lengthy and involved deliberations ensue, often lasting 
years. These are often limited in their conclusions by the imperfect state of 
ng knowledge, by the particular knowledge and capability of these 
experts who can be assembled at the time, and the results are often unsatis-
factory, unclear, and the subject of contention. I think this could often be 
the case here, where you are ultimately concerned with questions such as ship 
collision probability, the consequences of collision or other causes of 
structural failure, or of fire, of other environmental hazards, etc. You are 
here, fortunately enough, discussing risk before the event, but tragically 
enough, these studies are often carried out in the aftermath of accident, 
usually unforeseen, and the resolution is further hampered by an atmosphere of 
suspicion and blame, by considerations of legal and financial responsibility, 
and by urgent clamors for .remedial action and legislation. 
Given these facts, it seems to me that it is very much in the interest 
- industry government, to seek far-sighted sms 
scussions engineering risk avoidance and, particularly, the 
consequences of accident. With regard to the engineering and sci fie 
aspects, ons would very much improve the present situation: 
1.) that the State of California bring into being a small but 
adequate, and focussed expertise (Center of Expertise) 
on the engineering questions involved, and 
2.) nuous ica1 contact and even cooperation ensue 
between State, Industry, and Federal government engineers 
and scientists. 
I have earlier proposed that such a South-Central Coast Center of 
se be established at UCSB, based on existing and growing faculty 
lity, to emphasize: 
ship and platform safety and reliability 
environmental effects in the coastal zone 
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This Center would serve 
and Federal Agencies. Its 
collect and evaluate 
programs related to its major s 
environmental 1 and structural 
maneuverabili and co11i ion avoi 
capsizing and mooring 
cca 1 hore · 
scient if 
wave and current effects on shore and shore it es 
waste disposal and pollution in the coastal zones 
s 
ies, 
Jt onal 
incl ng the effect of oil spi 11 s technology for abatement. 
Such a Center would be unique in Cali ia, and perhaps in the U.S. It 
has an antecedent in the large Norwegian re Technology h Program 
funded by all participants in the Norwegian sector North Sea exploitation. 
Each of the State of California, the Federal Government, and the Offshore 
Oil Industry should be interested in such a Center of Expertise. The State 
(and local governments) they will badly need the se in the long 
run as an aid to governance and legislation and in ing with emergencies 
(think of the long and expensive fire in the Mexican sector of the Gulf); the 
Federal Government have re ibility for inspection and 
1 i cens i ng of offshore structures and operations (the Coast Guard and the 
Geological Survey); the Offshore Oil Indus because of their interest in 
persuing long-term exploitation in the South-Central Coast in harmony th 
public, state, local, and federal agencies and nterests. 
Whatever the form such far-s i measures as proposed above might 
eventually take, I urge the State as well as the other interested parties to 
begin implementing now so they can serve their purpose when the need 
arises. 
hall P 
Presi i a 1 sor, 
Professor Marshall Tulin has held President al Chair at UCSB since 1982, 
the University's first endowed chair. has been a member of the National 
Academy of Engineering s nee 1979 and was the Founder and Chairman of 
Hydronautics, Incorporated, a prominent and pioneering engineeri firm in the 
field of Ocean Engineering. is a former member of the Marine Board of the 
National Research Council, served the Federal Government in various 
scientific capacities, and is currently a member of the California Sea Grant 
Committee. 
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TEST MONY TO SENATE SUBCOMMI 
4 NOVEMBER 1985 
APPLICATION OF ANALYSIS RE 0 L AND GAS OPERAT 
BY 
PROFESSOR FLOYD R. TULER 
WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE WORCESTER, MA 0 609 
WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS RNING USE OF R YSIS 
N OFFSHORE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ABROAD. THESE COMMENTS COME FROM A 
• AND 
RCH Al 
M. . . ABOUT FOUR YEARS AGO SUPPORTED BY THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT 
SERVICE THROUGH A CONTRACT FROM SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES. 
AND OPIN ONS ARE SOLELY M NE AND THOSE OF MY CO-WORKERS: 
ILL, GEORGE AND DAV D CHENEY. 
OF IAL AND THE LIM TAT ONS OF ING RI 
ANLAYS S IN OFFSHORE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SUGGEST 
I POLICY OPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY GOVERNMENTAL AGENCI 
RATORS AND R PARTI INTE I FSHORE 
S BE USED BY REGULATORY IES 
R RCEMENT OF EXIST! SAFETY 
REMENTS AND SHING 
D RED OR AL PROBLEMS. FO EXAMPLE 
DEVELOPMENT OFF THE CAL RNIA COAST MIGHT BE MPROVED BY STUDI 
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THE POT NliAL CON~L[=rs BETWEEN OFFSHORE ACTIVITIES AND SH[~P!NG 
N ION. 
~ET0!00S CAN ALSO BE USED FOR REEXAMINING EXISTING REQUIREMENiS 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY ARE ACHIEVING THEIR GOALS AND THERE HAVE 
BEFN INSTANCES WHERE A RISK ANALYSIS HAS LED TO THE ELIMINATION OF AN 
EXISTING REGULATION. FOR EXAMPLE, A NORWEGIAN STUDY SHOWED THAT 
OVERALL RISK WAS LOWERED BY NOT REQUIRING STAND-BY SHIPS FOR NORTH S~A 
PLATFORMS. PREVIOUSLY, STAND-BY SHIPS HAD BEEN MANDATED. 
PRIVATE OPERATORS, SUCH AS OIL COMPANIES. DRILLING CONTRACTORS, 
EQUIPMENT DESIGNERS AND SYSTEM FABRICATORS MAY WISH TO CONSIDER 
EXPANDING THEIR USE OF PROBABALISTIC METHODS IN THEIR STUDIES OF THE 
HAZARDS OF NEW SYSTEMS THEY PROPOSE TO USE. THIS PRACTICE CO~D HELP 
MAKE THEIR DESIGNS AND OPERATIONS SAFER AND LESS COSTLY IN THE LONG 
RUN FOR THEMSELVES, FOR WORKERS AND THE ENVIRONMENT. FURTHERMORE, IN 
ADD ION TO SIMPLY PRESENTING RESULTS, PUBLISHING THE ASSUMPTIONS AND 
METHODS OF SUCH STUDIES WOULD PERMIT CRITICAL EVALUATION AND COULD 
HELP ALLAY PUBLIC CONCERNS ABOUT OFFSHORE HAZARDS. 
!NALLY, PUBLIC INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS SHOULD 
BE ALERT TO THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT GREATER USE OF THESE FORMAL 
METHODS OF ANALYSI~'MAY PRESENT TO THEM. IF PROPERLY USED, SUCH 
METHODS OFFER THE HOPE OF BETTER CONTROL OF LOW-PROBABILITY, HIGH-
CONSEQUENCE EVENTS OF THE SORT THAT SO OFTEN MOTIVATE OPPOSITION TO 
OFFSHORE AND OTHER MAJOR PROJECTS. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR SUCH GROUPS ro 
LEARN HOW RISK ANALYSIS WORKS AND HOW IT IS USED, SO TH~Y MAY BECOME 
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PART IC Pi4NTS 
WE SHOULD REALIZE RI ANALYS s 
MANAGEMENT OF ANY ASPECT OF 
AND I SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR USE FULL AWARENESS 
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS. THERE TO L 
IMPOSING A REQU OPER~HDRS 
FORMAL RISK ANALYSI 
AT THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ART OF I GlUE Al\iD 
IN THE UNITED R S~< ANAL YS S 1 SHOULD 
R USE IN UNUSUAL C 
ISK ANALYSIS HAS 
DECIS ON MAKERS ON LOW-PROBAB I IGH-CONSEQUENCE 
R 81-< AN~=IL YS I 8 OR ENTED TOWARD I 
UNREASONABLE TO XPECT I CAN SUBSTI 
I FWNMENTAL 
MOST CATAST 
APPROACHES CAN BEST BE VIEWED AS BE 
GHCJUU> BE 
I 
L. 
ANALYS S OF PROBABILI I 1 
I 
COIYJPLEMENH~ 
I 
TS 
FU 
IS. 
TS PRACTI 
tJSE: 
FROM THE DETERMINIST C METHODS THAT Y USED. 
ISI TO EFFECT I USE 
THE UNDESIREABLE CONSEQUENCES OF v FS 
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT FACT 
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EQUAL Y DAM~GING. 
EH CONS DER MORE F~R-R~ACHING CHANGES N 
RY SYSTEM THAT WOULD TAKE ADVANYAGE OF THE POWER OF FORMAL 
ANALYSIS. USED PROPERLY. RISK ANALYS~S CAN ALLOW FOR MURE 
IVE REGULA ION OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENYAL RISKS WHILE ALLDWl 
lN rRY GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGY AND 
OPERATIONAL METHODS, AND WHILE ASSIGNING MORE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY 
EFFEC IVE CONTROL OF HAZARDS TO THE OPERATING COMPANIES. 
BE DONE BY ADAPTING THE SELF-REGULATION APPROACH KNOWN IN NORWA 
AS INTERNAL CONTROL'', OR BY REQUIRING THAT OPERATORS ADOPT A FORMAL 
ROGRAM OF QUALITY ASSURANCE. 
'\ 
UNDER THE SYSTEM OF INTERNAL CONTROL, OPERATORS MUST FULFILL A SET OF 
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFETY MANGEMENT THAT SUBSTITulE 
THE ESrABLISriMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF DETAILED DESIGN AND OPERATlNG 
BY REGULATORY AUTHORITIES. AS COMPARED WITH MORE TRADITIONAL 
~4DPROACHES TO REGULATION, THIS SYSTEM INVOLVES SUBSTAI'lT IALL Y LESS DAY-
OVERSIGHT OF COMPANY OPERATIONS BY REGULATORY AUTHORITIES WHILE 
TRENGTHENING THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF OPERATORS FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
ACTIVITIES THROUGH FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. CLEARLY, AS WE HAVE 
TODAY, THE R~~ID INCREASE IN OFFSHORE ACTIVITY EXPECTED IN SAN 
BARBARA W LL OVERTAX THE REGULATORY AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE AGENCIES 
REGULAriONS REQUIRE FEWER REGULATORY STAFF THAN ARE NEEDED IF 
EVERY INSTALLATION IS DIRECTLY SUPERVISED BY GOVERNMENT 
REPRESENTRT VES. NEVERTHELESS, ALL OFFSHORE DESiGNS AN~ OPERATIONS 
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WOULD REIYiAIN SUBJECT TO RANDOM SPOT CHECKS BY 1-=IUTHDRITIEEl. 
FORMAL ANALYSIS OF RISK PLAYS A KEY ROLE IN DETERM NING WHETHE 
PROPOSED DESIGN IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OVERALL LEVELS OF ACCEPTABLE 
FORTH BY THE REGULATING AGENCY. EFFECTIVE USE OF THE 
OF Nl RNAL CONTROL REQUIRES THAT A LEVEL OF ACCEPTABLE RISK 
SP~ClFlED SO THAl HE OPERATORS CAN SHDW THA) lHEY 
STEPS NECESSARY TO DESIGN AN ACCEPTABLE SYSTEM AND OPERAT 
HOWEVER, ESTABLISHING A LEVEL OF ACCEPTABLE RISK HAS PROVEN TU BE 
E CONTROVERSIAL IN NORWAY FOR OFFSHORE REGULATION AND N THE U.S. 
FUR REGULATING SUCH rECHNOLOGIES AS NUCLEAR POWER. WHETHER AN 
ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF RISK C0N BE ESTABLISHED FOR OFFSHORE ACTIVITIES N 
THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL REGIONS REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED. 
N SUMMARY, THE USE OF RISK ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES AS A TOOL FOR 
[UENII Y1NG AND MI IGATING HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE 
H OPPDRTUNI IES AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS FOR ALL PARTIES CONCERN~D 
ACT 'v' J. T ES. INCREASED USE OF THESE TECHNIQUES CAN TU 
MAKE OFFSHORE OPERATIONS SAFER. 
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CALIFORNIA SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 
CLAIR GHYLIN 
GENERAL MANAGER 
WESTERN REGION LAND DEPARTMENT 
CHEVRON U.S.A. INC. 
NOVEMBER 4, 1985 
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CHEVRON'S POINT ARGUELLO PROJE H EN 
CALIFORNIA IS A STUDY OF STR GLES AND CO RATION 
BETWEEN INDUSTRY, LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERA E N 
AGENCIES, AND PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS, THE E GR 
HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THE MYRIAD PERMITTIN 
JURISDICTIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN THAT HAVE 
STOOD TN THE WAY OF DEVELOPING CALIFORNIA 1 S SHORE 
RESOURCES, THE PERMITTING AND JURISDICTION OVE AP 
HAVE BEEN CREATED BY A NUMBER OF SINGLE ISSUE FEDERA 
LAWS PASSED IN THE LA HJO DECADES, INCLUDIN 
THE OCS LANDS AcT AND ITS AMENDMENTS 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION T OF 1 q 
MARINE SANCTUARIES AcT OF 1977 
CoASTAL ~ONE MANAGEMENT T OF 2 
ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT OF 1973 
(LEAN WATER AcT AS AMEN ED TN 19 
-ll -
As A RES T OF THIS, AT LE ST 8 FEDER ENCIE 
ST ISSUE A ROV S BEFORE EXPLORATION AND PRO CTION 
ACTIVITIES CAN BEGIN. 
lN ADDITION THERE ARE A NUMBER OF STATE AND L 
LA THAT GOVERN AND PERMITS THAT ARE REQUIRED. IN 
FACT, E NUMBER OF AGENCIES INVOLVED IN EITHER ISSUING 
A PERMIT, APPROVAL OR CERTIFICATION OR IN REVIEWING AND 
COMMENTING ON OCS ACTIVITIES INCREASES AS THOSE 
TIVITIES MOVE FROM THE EXPLORATORY PHASE TO THE 
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION STAGES. FoR INSTANCE, IN 
( IFO A SOME OF THE AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE OCS 
PROCESS ARE: 
IN THE ExPLORATION PHASE, STATE AGENCIES INCLUDE 
H 0FFI E OF p NING AND RESEA H, COAST (OMMISSI N 
AND LOCAL AGENCIES INCLUDE CoUNTY AIR PoLLUTION 
DISTRICTS. 
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BuT WHEN WE GET TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION 
PHASES THEN STATE AGENCIES INVOLVED ARE: OFFICE OF 
PLANNING AND RESEARCH, COASTAL COMMISSION, STATE LANDS 
COMMISSION, AIR RESOURCES BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND 
GAME, DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION, STATE WATER 
REsouRcEs CoNTROL BoARD, DEPARTMENT oF CoNSERVATION, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. LOCAL AGENCIES INCLUDE 
CoUNTY AIR POLLUTION DISTRICTS, REGIONAL WATER 0UALITY 
CoNTROL BoARDS, CITY PLANNING DEPARTMENTS, PuBLIC WoRKS 
DEPARTMENTS, CITY AND CoUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENTS, AND 
PoLICE DEPARTMENTS, 
IN 1081 THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORTED TO 
CONGRESS ON THE IMPACT OF REGULATIONS DURING THE 
EXPLORATORY AND DEVELOPMENT PHASE AND MADE THE 
FOLLOWING FINDINGS: 
nTHE OuTER CoNTINENTAL SHELF POTENTIALLY CAN 
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PROVIDE THE NATION WITH SIGNIFICANT FUTURE OIL AN 
GAS RESOURCES. BuT, THE FULL POTENTIAL WILL NOT 
BE REALIZED UNLESS: 
VARIOUS FEDERAL AGENCIES INVOLVED ISSUE 
PERMITS AND COMPLETE OTHER AUTHORIZATION 
ACTIONS WITHIN A STANDARD, REASONABLE TIME 
WHICH GAO BELIEVES SHOULD BE A MAXIMUM OF 90 
DAYS. 
COASTAL STATES ARE ENCOURAGED TO DEVELOP 
PROCESSES FOR LOCAL REVIEWS AND ISSUING 
PERMITS WHICH ARE MORE TIMELY AND UNIFORM 
WITH FEDERAL PROCESSES, 
CREDIBILITY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 
PROCESS IS MORE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED TO 
MINIMIZE CHALLENGES AND DELAYS ... 11 
WE ARE NEARING COMPLETION OF THE PERMITTING 
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PROCESS FOR OUR PoiNT ARGUELLO OFFSHORE PRO E TH 
PT. ARGUELLO PROJECT INCLUDES CHEVRON 1 S PLATFORM 
HIDALGO - 56 SLOTS IN 430' OF WATER LOCATED 5 5 MI ES 
SW OF PT. ARGUELLO -TEXACO's PLATFORM HARVEST - 0 
SLOTS IN 570' OF WATER AND CHEVRON 1 S PLATFORM HERMOSA -
48 SLOTS - IN 60?' OF WATER; TWO SUBSEA PIPELINES 
CONNECTING THE PLATFORMS AND THEN GOING ONSHORE AT 
PoiNT CONCEPTION THEN ON TO THE PROCESSING F ILITIES 
AT GAVIOTA. THIS IS THE FIRST MAJOR OFFSHORE PROJECT 
TO GO THROUGH THE ENTIRE PERMITTING PROCE SINCE T E 
GAO 1981 REPORT TO CoNGREss. I THINK IT wouLD BE 
INTERESTING TO SEE HOW WE ARE DOING. 
FIRST. FEDERAL PERMIIS. THE COMPTROLLER GENER 
THINKS THE FEDERAL AGENCIES SHOULD COMPLE THEIR 
AUTHORIZATION WITHIN A STANDARD REASONAB E TIME--A 
MAXIMUM OF 90 DAYS, 
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IN J Y, 19 , CHEVRON BEGAN FORMAL PREPARATION F 
D ELOPME AND PROD TION PLAN AND ENVIR M T 
REPORT (DPP/ER) AND OIL SPILL AND EMERGENCY CONTINGENC 
PL AND IN DECEMBER, 1982, THEY WERE SUBMITT TO THE 
M NERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, 
MORE THAN 90 DAYS LATER, IN MAY, 1983, THE PLAN 
DEEMED COMPLETE THE MMS. THIS IS NOT AN 
THE DPP/ER IS READY BE PUT THROUGH SEVERAL EXTENSIV 
D DETAILE E lEW PR ESSES MANDATED BY THE COAST 
Z E AN EMENT AcT, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL P I Y 
T THE C iFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QuALI AcT AND B 
LOCAL COASTAL PLANS. 
AT THI TIME CHEVRON BEGAN SUBMITTING TO THE 
F REVIEW AND APPROVAL DETAILED STRUCTURAL PLANS AND 
SPECIFICATIONS FOR PLATFORM HERMOSA AND ASSOCIATED 
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PIPELINES. THIS IS AN ONGOING PR ESS N A 
AT THE DESIGN PHASE, FABRICATION PHASE D IN T LAT 
PHASE. THESE PLANS MUST BE APPROVED T E MMS EF 
PLATFORM HERMOSA CAN BE TRANSPORTED TO THE INS L I N 
SITE. APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN OTHER PLANS RELATED TO 
ACTUAL OPERATIONS fSAFETY, COMMUNICATIONS 
TRANSPORTATION, TRAINING, ETC.) MUST BE S MITTED AND 
APPROVED BY THE MMS BEFORE OPERATI S CAN COMMENCE N 
THE PLATFORM. FINALLY, A SEPARATE APPLICATION FOR A 
PERMIT TO DRILL MUST BE FILED WITH THE MMS FOR E 
WELL TO BE DRILLED FROM THE PLATFORM. 
OTHER AREAS OF DIR T INVOLVEMENT WITH THE 
THE PERMITTING PROCESS INCLUDED: APPROVAL ROYA 
V UATION AND PROD TION ALL ATION METHODS, APPR AL 
OF PIPELINES' LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM, APPROVAL W 
o·IL AND NATURAL GAS METERING STEMS, ISSUANCE OF 
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R GHTS WAY FOR PIPELINES ON THE OCS AND APPROV 
A 0 EVACUATI D SHELTERING PLANS INVOLVING 
ANDENBERG MISSLE AND SHUTTLE LAUNCHES, 
IN MAY. 1985, THE MMS SENT THE PLAN CDPP/ER) TO 
E CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION FOR CONSISTENCY 
REVIEW PURSUANT TO THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT AcT. 
AT AB T THIS TIME, WE BEGAN PREPARING AND FILING 
APPLICATIONS FOR PERMITS AND APPROVALS FROM OTHER 
FEDERAL AGENCIES: CoRPS OF ENGINEERS, ENVIRONMENTAL 
PRoTECTION AGENCY. CoAST GuARD. FEDERAL AviATION 
ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS CoMMISSION AND 
THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY CoMMISSION, NoNE OF 
THESE AGENCIES CAN ISSUE THEIR PERMITS AND APPROVALS 
NTIL AFTER NEPA/CEQA REVIEW PROCESS IS COMPLETE AND 
MMS HAS GIVEN FINAL APPROVAL TO THE PLAN (DPP/ER), 
IN OcTOBER, 198), THE 59-wEEK JOINT FEDERAL/sTATE 
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E s 
As STATE AND L 
PERMITS, THE R 0 CONGRESS RECOMMENDED nCOASTAL 
S TES ARE ENCOURAGED TO DEVELOP PROCESSES FOR L 
R IE D ISSUI PERMITS WHICH ARE MORE TIM AND 
UNIFORM WITH FEDERAL PROCESSES.n WE WERE ABLE TO 
RS TATE CoAST COMMISSION AND SANTA BARBARA 
COUNTY PERMITS SIM TANEOUSLY WITH THE FEDERAL PERMITS 
A LOT TIME WAS SAVED. ST1 THE OVERLAP AND 
LICATION IS B GLING. 
IN No EMBER 1983, THE CoASTAL CoMMISION GRANTED 
CONSI TE CERTIFICATION OR THE DEVELOPMENT AND 
TION PLAN FOR E FIRST PLATFORM. THE PLAN HAD 
BE SUBMITTED THE CALIFORNIA CoASTAL CoMMISSION FOR 
CONSISTENC CERTIFICATION BY THE MMS ON MAY 19, 1983. 
THE COASTAL Co SSION HELD PUBLIC HEARINGS ON JULY 
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TH, AuGusT 7 o, EPTE ER 
F N 
ESS AN E u -M N 
R IEW PR T, 
T L M 
PLA ORM N THE FIELD, T LA 
T ANSMITTED E CoAs A CoM 
A SING E 
CONCU E 
p 
TS 
T N RTA I 
B B UN 
N 
s 
TH R 0 SI 
BE 
THE 0 
E 
R 
) 
v 
0 
M Y CONCERNS RE~ARDING 1) TRANPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL' 
MARINE RESOURCES, )) COMMERCI FISHING; 4) CRUDE 
OIL SPILLS; 5) VESSEL TRAFFIC SAFETY; 6) AIR QUAL! 
7) VISU AND SCENIC RESOURCES; AND 8) PUBLIC WELFARE. 
OF THE ISSUES RELATED TO THE ALTERNATIVE OF USING 
TANKERS TO MOVE CRUDE OIL TO REFINERIES, By 
SUBSTITUTING A PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, THE 
CoMMISSION FELT THAT THE ADVERSE IMPACTS ASSOCIATED 
WITH TANKER USE HAD BEEN MITIGATED. 
FoR VESS TRAFFIC SAFETY, WE COMMITTED TO THE 
PL EMENT AN AUTOMATIC RADAR PLOTTING AID ON 
p A ORM HERMOSA, THE COST HERE IS NOT SIGNIFICANT, 
BUT THE OPERATIONAL COST OF MANNING IT 24 HOURS PER 
, IN ADDITION TO PROBLEMS CREATED BY ITS NOT HAVING 
BEEN DESIGNED IN THE OPERATIONS ROOM CREATED 
SUBSTANTIAL DIFFICULTIES IN REFORMATTING THE CONTR S 
-1~~-
T T 
E 
y 
FoR HE EAN OF OIL SPILLS, WE OMMITTED TO 
Q E A ESS iL MR. CLEAN AND STATI 
A R NEAR E SITE PLATF M HERMOSA, THIS W LL 
T 0 IMATELY $1 S MI TO $2 MILLION. THIS 
S N LUDE ANNU OPERATING COSTS. 
THE WHOLE PERMITTING PROCESS HAS REEN LO AND 
B T so IGHTENING AND E RAGING 
THE FIRST FAVORA E CONSISTENCY DETERMINATION FROM 
TH AST OMMISSI F OWED 5 NTH OF I ENS I E 
E TI AT I WiT THE Co A AL Co ISSI ND ITS STA 
M J R AREAS OF E IRONMENT CONCERN, 
RECEDEN ED S 0 IN F THE PROJECT AM 
F OM THE CIT OF SANTA BARBARA, THE ( NTY BOARD OF 
SOR MBERS OF THE STATE LEGI 
THE STATE ADMIN STRATION, THE DEPARTMENT 
D ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERS. 
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C TIN ING THROUGH THIS DATE, WE HAVE BEEN MEETING WITH 
LEADERS, FISHERMEN AND NATIVE 
AMERICANS, VISTA DEL MAR ScHOOL BOARD, CITIZEN GROUPS 
rsucH AS CITIZENS PLANNING ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE 
CENTER), LOCAL LANDOWNERS, THE REGIONAL WATER QuALITY 
CoNTROL BoARD, CouNTY HEALTH SERVICES DEPARTMENT. 
uN BuiLDING AND SAFETY DEPARTMENT. CouNTY RoADS 
DEPARTMENT (IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR MEETINGS WITH 
C TRANS FOR OUR PROPOSED OVERPASS), THE LOCAL 
CALIFORNIA STATE PARK AND RECREATION DEPARTMENT, AND 
FISH AND GAME. 
AFTER OUR APPLICATION WAS DEEMED COMPLETE BY THE 
COUNTY, IT TRIGGERED A )0-WEEK ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 
PERIOD. THE LAW CALLS FOR A 5?-WEEK REVIEW PERIOD; 
HOWEVER, CHEVRON CONSENTED TO AN ADDITIONAL SEVEN-WEEK 
EXTENSION TO ALLOW FOR BOTH THE PUBLIC AND THE CouNTY 
-132-

T E EAR N S THE N B AR OF S ER SO S 
N E R H R NGS 
R WEEKS. F OSE HEARING RING 
THE PU IC PARTICIPATED F LY D FREE , THE BOARD OF 
ER SORS PR ED THE PROJECT DECEMBER lR, 1984 
THE PROJECT APPROVAL CARRIED WITH IT OVER 160 PERMIT 
DIT ONS WHICH C D A ADDITION $ 
THE ROJECT COST, 
SEPA ATE E s F THE CHEVRON PROJECT H E 
BE FiLED WI THE CoAST MMISSION, THE APPEAL 
AN E E R MENT DEFENSE CEN ER R I E M 
T E SAME E M N IS E D B S 
LEGES T T E MEN N SIS S I 0 ETE 
NADE ATE AND T SHO T. THE c AST Co M I S 
REJ TED B H PE S R L 9 
T LAWSUI S H E BE FI ED AGAINST THE C N 
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..,,,,,,...,.,, . .., S HEAVY l 
OTHER MATERIALS, SUCH AS NATURAL GAS LIQUIDS (NGL), 
THE OIL, SO THAT IT WILL FLOW MORE EASI THROUGH 
BARBARA COUNTY IS REQUIRING THAT THIS BLENDING WITH NGL 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PIPELINE SYSTEM {KNOWN AS THE ~== 
WE BELIEVE THIS PROCESS PRESENTS A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS 
HAZARD. NGLS ARE HIGHLY VOLATILEs AND ANY PIPELINE BREAKAGE 
TO A CRITICAL INCIDENT. WE ARE VERY CONCERNED THAT THE 
FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS BE DISCUSSED AND PLANNED FOR EARLY 
FOR EXAMPLE, THE ANGELES PIPELINE, A HEW SEGMENT 
PIPELINE SYSTEM, WILL BE 130 MILES LONG AND Will 
CITIES AND 18 OF UNINCORPORATED COUNTY AREAS. 
SOUND. AND CONSIDERATION MUST BE 
IN DENSELY 
SOUTHERN FORNIA 
PREPARED FOR THE GOVERNOR 1 S 
9 A SCENARIO WAS DEVELOPED 
REPORT INDICATED THAT 
AREAS ALONG 
l NGL IS SUCH A 
A MAJOR EARTHQUAKE. 
TASK FORCE ON 
AN EARTHQUAKE OF 
THE EVENT OF SUCH A 
PIPELINE FACILITIES WOULD PROBABLY SUSTAIN VARYING DEGREES OF DAMAGE 
THE PROXIMITY TO THE ACTUAL FAULT LINE AND THE STABILITY 
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MANAGEMENT. UNLIKE OFFSHORE 
A PIPELINE ACCIDENT, INDIVIDUAl 
SITUATION 
,IT 
OR COUNTIES 
EXPERIENCES OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MANAGEMENT. 
, AWARENESS AND GOOD, QUICK COMMUNICATION ARE THE 
ACTION. 
WORK TOGETHER ALMOST AS A nPIPELINE MANAGEMENT 
, PREPARING EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TEAMS OF 
INATING WITH Oil COMPANI STATE OFFICIALS. 
MANAGEMENT, I WOULD TO IN 
ENHANCE lOCAl GOVERNMENTS ABILITY TO COORD 
ACTUALLY 
SACRAMEHTOt AND 
COMMITTEE I HAVE FORWARDED 
THE EFFECT 
SPEAK AT 
QUESTIONS .. 
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IN 
MANAGEMENT 
IDEA IN THIS "'-"'"'"'' 
. I 
